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ARTICLES
The Chinese Traditions Inimical
to the Patent Law
Liwei Wang*
China has had a great civilization for millennia. Until the 15th cen-
tury, Chinese technological discoveries and inventions were often far in
advance of those in Europe.1 Francis Bacon (1561-1626) even maintained
that Chinese "printing, gunpowder, and the magnet have changed the
whole face and state of things throughout the world ... no empire, no
sect, no star seems to have exerted greater power and influence in human
affairs than these mechanical discoveries." 2 However, China has insti-
gated no revolutions in science' in the recent past. Nowhere in the world
has the clash between traditional culture and societal modernization been
more powerful than in China.4
These phenomena remind us of a common view that China's mod-
ernization of science and technology is "burdened by a number of con-
straints, primarily constraints in traditional culture and in the Marxist-
* SJD 1993, University of Wisconsin Law School; graduate student, 1983, China University of
Political Science and Law. The author is grateful to Prof. J. Kidwell and Prof. Z. Zile for their
generous help; particular thanks to Dean David Trubek for his insightful advice.
1 1 JOSEPH NEEDHAM, SCIENCE AND CIVILIZATION IN CHINA 4 (1965).
2 Francis Bacon, The New Organon, in THE NEW ORGANON 118 (F. Anderson ed., 1981).
3 By "revolutions in science," I mean the transition like that in the "exact sciences" between
Galileo and Laplace (1741-1827) and its wider repercussions by 1800 in Europe. See Sivin, Why the
Scientific Revolution Did Not Take Place in China-Or Didn't It? 5 CHINESE SCIENCE 45 (1982).
4 Nancy Besnkopf Tucker, China and America: 1941-1991, 1991 FOREIGN AFF. 75, 76.
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Leninist one-party state." 5 More specifically, in discussing the patent law
of the People's Republic of China (PRO), Beaumont claimed that the
"two-fold problem in stimulating innovation" is "a residual mistrust of
innovation as a result of years of foreign imperialistic colonization," and
of "finding ways to encourage and reward innovation which are congru-
ent with Marxist thought."6 This article asserts that China's traditional
culture is probably as inimical to patent law as it is to the modernization
of science and technology.
The PRC's scientific and technological modernization is directly
owed to Deng Xiaoping, the current leader in China. No sooner had
Xiaoping risen to power at the end of the 1970's, than "the Four Mod-
ernizations"-modernization of industry, agriculture, national defense,
and science and technology-became the dominant goal of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) and the PRC government.7 Chinese leadership
still takes science and technology as the key to realize the other three
modernizations.' In response to this commitment, the Fourth Session of
the Standing Committee of the Sixth National People's Congress promul-
gated the Patent Law in 1984.1 This law stimulates the Chinese people's
enthusiasm for inventions and protects foreign intellectual property
rights in China.
Like its Western counterpart, the PRC's Patent Law conceives of an
invention or innovation as a creation which transcends the prior art of
the relevant field of human knowledge. Article 22 provides that "[a]ny
invention or utility model for which patent right may be granted must
possess novelty, inventiveness and practical applicability." 10 This provi-
sion is similar to that of the United States Patent Act: the patentability
of a subject matter depends on its "novelty," "obviousness," and "util-
ity." 1 The PRC's Patent Law awards the patentees private property
rights in their inventions and excludes, to a considerable extent, all
others from using the inventions without the patentees' permission for a
certain number of years.12 Consequently, this socialist patent law deepens
5 Goldman & Simon, The Onset of China's New Technological Revolution, in SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY IN POST-MAO CHINA 4 (1989).
6 William E. Beaumont, The New Patent Law of the People's Republic of China (PRC): Evidence
of A Second Chinese "Renaissance"? 27 IDEA 39, 43-44 (1986).
7 Communique of the Third Plenary Session of the 11th CCP Central Committee, PEKING REV.
6-16 (Dec. 29, 1978).
8 TONY SAICH, CHINA'S SCIENCE POLICY IN THE 80'S 1 (1989).
9 Patent Law of the PRC, March 12, 1984, 5 WIS. INT'L L. J. 164 (1986).
10 Id. at 167.
11 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1965).
12 D. DONG, ZHONGGUO ZHUANLI ZHISHI JIANGZUO [A COURSE OF LECTURES ON THE CHI-
NESE PATENT LAW] 43-46 (1987).
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people's impulse for commercial profit.
Patent law is affected by people's understanding of, and approach to,
the world. If a religious or metaphysical approach to the world prevails
in a nation, a patent law could hardly spark modem science and technol-
ogy. At the same time, patent law is affected by people's values such as
the interest in science and technology, or the desire for commercial
profit, which is the motivating force behind a patent. If people are indif-
ferent to innovation and view commercial incentives as shameful, a pat-
ent law would mean little. If such traditions linger today, they must be
inimical to the creation of a patent law. Specifically in China, then, what
kinds of traditions-if any-are inimical to the PRC's Patent Law?
The main thesis of this essay is that there are some Chinese tradi-
tions inimical to a patent law, and that these traditions were utilized by
Mao Zedong (1893-1976), the top leader in the PRC, because the social-
ist regime shared some irrationality with the monarchic regime. There
are four parts in this essay. The first part attacks the opinion that the
Patent Law is burdened by "a residual mistrust of innovation." The sec-
ond part discusses the traditional Chinese cognitive methodologies for
scientific inquiry, which, though undesirable, are insignificant in the
PRC's Patent Law today. The third part attempts to prove that Chinese
tradition ignored science and technology while stressing politics and the
humanities, and that this tradition scorned commercial profit while in-
sisting on Confucian morality. The socialist ideology inherited and car-
ried forward these traditions inimical to a patent law. The final part
concludes that it is the monarchic-like regime behind Maoism which
should be changed in light of the Patent Law.
This essay is a comparative work. Western history does not neces-
sarily provide a path which other nations must ineluctably follow.13 Nor
is the model of Western scientific and technological development the ab-
solute criterion to measure development in other societies. On the other
hand, the Western model of science is the most successful in history. If
there are some factors universally essential to scientific and technological
development, the Western model should contain them. Therefore, I will
discuss some situations in the West to highlight the relevant issues in
China. In addition, a comparison of China and the West is appropriate
because people can hardly stand apart from their own culture and view
13 David M. Trubek, "Law and Development": What We Know and What We Do Not Know, in 1
SINO-AMERICAN ECONOMIC AND CIVIL LAW CONFERENCE 1, 40-41 (THE COMMITTEE ON
LEGAL EDUCATION EXCHANGE WITH CHINA ed., 1989) (available in the Committee on Legal Edu-
cation Exchange with China in Columbia Law School).
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 14:15 (1993)
other societies in a completely impartial fashion. 4 A comparison will
help people avoid "measuring others' corn by one's own bushel," as the
proverb goes.
This essay is not meant as an exhaustive discussion on which Chi-
nese traditions are inimical to the PRC's Patent Law, because such an
inquiry encompasses too many issues. For example, "science and tech-
nology" is a modern phrase in China, though I use the phrase freely; in
Chinese history, there was not even an equivalent concept of the English
word "science." The current Chinese word "kexue" (science) was intro-
duced from Japan at the end of last century.15 I therefore confine myself
mainly to those issues which I think are important to Chinese patent law
and those issues which are controversial.
I. "A RESIDUAL MISTRUST OF INNOVATION"?
In discussing the PRC's Patent Law, William Beaumont claims:
[P]erhaps a more serious, and more pervasive, result of the Western preda-
tion, was the development of an enormous body of reactionary opinion
which was hostile to Westerners, in particular, and to innovations, in gen-
eral. Thus, the present Chinese leadership faces at least a two-fold problem
in stimulating innovation.... The most basic problem relates to a residual
mistrust of innovation as a result of years of foreign imperialistic
colonization.
16
This claim seems to be an overestimation of the historical facts. It is
normally held that Western science and technology were first introduced
into China in 1581 by an Italian missionary, Matthoeus Ricci (1552-
1610), who was sent by the Society of Jesus. After Ricci came other
missionaries, who brought advanced knowledge of astronomy, mathe-
matics, etc. to China. Many of them became officials in the central gov-
ernment. But the emperors did not understand the significance of this
knowledge and Chinese society remained apathetic toward it. On the
other hand, the Chinese were not hostile to the Westerners, nor to their
science, technology, or innovations.17 An example illustrating Chinese
attitudes arose in 1793, when the British government sent Lord Ma-
14 William p. Alford, The Inscrutable Occidental? Implications of Robert Unger's Uses and
Abuses of the Chinese Past, 64 TEx. L. REv. 915, 965 (1986).
15 Fan, "Mr. Science" and the New Culture Movement: An Investigation from the Angle of Social
History of Science, 3 LISHI YANJIO [HISTORY STUDIES] 36, 39-40 (1989).
16 Beaumont, supra note 6, at 43.
17 SHIRAN Du ET AL., ZHONGGUO KEXUE JISHU SHIGAO II [II THE DRAFT OF CHINESE SC-
ENCE AND TECHNOLOGY HISTORY] 197-98, 205 (1983). Between the 16th and 17th centuries, the
missionaries who could be verified by their books numbered more than 70. Of the more than 370
kinds of books introduced into China, more than 120 were scientific ones. Ye, Chinese Traditional
Culture and the Influx of Western Learning, 1 HISTORY STUDIES 7 (1983).
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cartney to China to establish business and diplomatic relations. Ma-
cartney showed advanced firearms to a Chinese official but the otherwise
open-minded official responded indifferently: "I may look at the firearms
or not, whatever you wish. I don't think there is anything valuable or
unique in them."18
Western predation of China began with the 1840 Opium War be-
tween Britain and China. After losing the War, the Chinese Celestial
Empire was forced to sign a series of unequal treaties with Western Pow-
ers. The Chinese painfully experienced Western exploitation and oppres-
sion for the first time in history. However, the Chinese also considered
the shortcomings of China and the strong points of the West. Some
high-ranking officials thought that the only way out for China was to
learn science and technology from the Western Powers. 9 To be sure,
some Chinese, including certain ranking officials, tried to reject every-
thing foreign and scorned innovation, but as they were a minority, they
accomplished little.
Hence came the unprecedented Westernization Movement [Yangwu
Yundong] in the 1860s, aimed at gaining wealth and strength through
learning science and technology from the West. The Chinese govern-
ment established many translation institutions, industrial enterprises,
and modem schools; the government employed many foreign experts and
sent many diplomatic delegations and students abroad to study.20 The
failure of the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 doomed the Westerniza-
tion Movement.21 Still, on January 1, 1896, China's leading newspaper
SHEN BAO proposed the Western patent system, holding that an impor-
tant reason for the backwardness of Chinese science and technology was
the absence of a patent system. On July 13, 1898, the government
promulgated the first patent act in Chinese history, the Reward Regula-
tions for Promoting Technology Development [Zhenxing Gongyi Geii-
ang Zhangcheng]. In the same year, Zishou Chen was awarded a patent
for his spinning machine.22
At the end of the 19th century, China was partitioned by the West-
em Powers of Britain, Germany, and Russia.23 In 1898, Chinese reform-
18 Ye, Traditional Culture in Modern China, 1 HISTORY STUDIES 84, 99 (1985).
19 Du ET AL., supra note 17, at 233, 243.
20 Ye, supra note 18, at 9-11.
21 Du ET AL., supra note 17, at 289.
22 Li, The Trends of Scientific and Technological Modernization in the 1898 Reform Period, 6
HISTORY STUDIES 123, 134-35 (1990).
23 In 1887, the German troops occupied Jiaozhouwan Port, and the Russian troops occupied
Lushun port; in 1899, the French set up a navy base in Guangzhouwan port. Britain, Japan, and the
United States all tried to expand their forces in China.
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ists waged the Reform Movement [Wuxu Bianfa], attempting to model
China on the West in a more comprehensive way. Though the Move-
ment lasted only 103 days, the policy of learning science and technology
from the West by no means stopped. From 1900 to 1906, more than
10,000 students were sent abroad by the Chinese government.24 In 1912,
the newly established Republic of China promulgated the Provisional
Regulations of the Reward for Handicraft [Jiangli Gongyipin Zanxing
Zhangcheng]. Although this government did not promulgate a patent
law until 1945, it granted more than 600 patents from 1912 to 1944.25
At the beginning of this century the Chinese literati critically ex-
amined Chinese traditional culture and boldly explored the new culture
from the West. In 1915, the first issue of SCIENCE [Kexue], a well-
known magazine, declared that "in those powerful countries, democratic
rights and national strength must have developed side by side with their
science." New Youth [Xinqinnian], the magazine exerting the most tre-
mendous influence on the Chinese, ardently advocated similar ideas.26
After World War I, the victorious nations drafted the Paris Peace
Treaty, more or less treading Chinese sovereignty underfoot. On May 4,
1919, enraged university students demonstrated in Beijing opposing this
Western imperialist treaty. Supported by workers and businessmen in
the major cities, the demonstrations greatly stimulated the literati's patri-
otic enthusiasm. The May Fourth Movement held high two great ban-
ners-"Mr. Democracy" and "Mr. Science" borrowed from the West-
as the means to criticize feudal traditions and as the goals to be realized
in a new China. This movement became one of the most important
events in Chinese modern history. Hu Shih (1891-1962), a leading
scholar, commented in 1923: "For the past 30 years, a word has almost
gained the highest dignity. No one, a conservative or a reformist, aware
of the word or unaware, dares to show a scornful or teasing attitude
openly to it. This word is no other but 'Science.' "27
It might be argued that even if the Chinese government and the lite-
rati had no mistrust of innovation, the masses, represented by the Yi Ho
Tuan Movement or the Boxers in Hebei Province in 1900, did. In addi-
tion to fighting against Western troops, the Boxers killed many Western
missionaries and demolished the railway and electric lines. Even those
persons who smoked cigarettes, wore glasses, and held foreign umbrellas
24 Du ET AL., supra note 17, at 298-99.
25 DONG, supra note 12, at 11-12.
26 Duan, Three Forms of the Development of a Scientific Outlook in Modern China, 6 HISTORY
STUDiEs 111, 116-17 (1990).
27 Fan, supra note 15, at 39, 47.
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were killed.28 The cause of this Movement is complicated, but the Chi-
nese mistrust of, and even hostility toward, the innovation was unques-
tionably due to their hostility toward the Western colonists. Such
"mistrust of innovation" is unlikely to linger today, for several reasons:
(1) A nation's hostility to other nations does not necessarily cause its
rejection of all things relevant to those nations. The history of Japan
may prove this point.29 (2) Compared with the West, the government
and the literati in China enjoyed greater authority over the masses, so
that the masses were more inclined to obey governmental policy and the
literati's attitude. (3) Such "mistrust" was not in conformity with Chi-
nese tradition, nor with Chinese people's interests. Though rampant in
an area for a while, the "mistrust" could hardly reside in the Chinese
nation for a century despite drastic changes in the society.
The Chinese did bear resentment against the predatory Western
Powers after the 1840 Opium War. However, the main sentiment among
the Chinese was a desire for science and technology to safeguard against
the Western Powers. A "mistrust of innovation," existing only among
the ignorant minority in the past, must be insignificant today if there is
any residue at all. Therefore, it would be an exaggeration to claim "a
residual mistrust of innovation" against the PRC's Patent Law. Conse-
quently, we may dismiss this "problem."
II. THE UNDERSTANDING AND APPROACH TO THE WORLD
The great scientist Albert Einstein (1879-1955) once said,
The development of Western science has been based on two great achieve-
ments, the invention of the formal logical system (in Euclidean geometry)
by Greek philosophers, and the discovery of the possibility of finding out
causal relationship by systematic experiment (at the Renaissance). In my
opinion one need not be astonished that the Chinese sages did not make
these steps. The astonishing thing is that these discoveries were made at
all.
30
Chinese scholars believe that experimental methodology, logical method-
ology and mathematical methodology are the three pillars supporting
modern science.31 The relationship between the appropriate methodolo-
gies and a patent law is obviously close: without appropriate methodolo-
gies guiding invention, a patent law would mean little. If no appropriate
methodologies existed in the past and the same is true today, it will cer-
28 X. DAI, Yi Ho TUAN YANJIU [THE STUDY OF THE BOXERS] 91-92 (1963).
29 Ding & Du, An Elementary Analysis of the Factors in Capitalist Modernization in China and
Japan during the 19th Century, 1 HIsroRY STUDIES 37, 37-53 (1983).
30 JOSEPH NEEDHAM, THE GRAND TITRATION 43 (1972).
31 Li, supra note 22, at 126.
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tainly be inimical to the PRC's Patent Law. Hence, we should see
whether the Chinese sages failed to discover the methodologies and if the
void still exists today. Since the role of "systematic experiment" is simi-
lar to that of a "logical system" in terms of its significance to scientific
methodology, I shall discuss the "logical system" issue only.
A. The Absence of Methodologies for Scientific Inquiry
In traditional China, the Song Dynasty (960-1279) and the Yuan
Dynasty (1271-1368) were the heyday of scientific and technological de-
velopment. There were admirable achievements in astronomy, mathe-
matics, agronomy, etc. Then came the stagnation.32 The Chinese made
innumerable discoveries and inventions in history, but their achieve-
ments were primarily techniques, not sciences. 33 The practice-oriented
tradition of Chinese science and technology seemed influenced by what
Kuang Xun (313-238 B.C.), a famous Confucian scholar, said: "When
dealing with the various things in the universe, gentlemen do not strive to
explain the causes [of events], but try to utilize the things wisely."34
Hu Shih maintained that during the Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) and
the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911), Chinese scholars identified the ancient
pronunciation of words by skillfully combining induction and deduc-
tion.35 However, if there were a "spirit and method of 'exact and impar-
tial inquiry,'" as Hu Shih claimed,36 they were never applied to science
and technology. One of the theories most closely connected with science
and technology in traditional China is the two-force [yin, yang] and five-
element [wuxing: metal, wood, water, fire, and earth] theory. Examining
this theory, one may see the lack of methodologies for scientific inquiry.
Originally, the two-force and five-element theory was two separate
theories. Philosopher Ran Zou (305?-240 BC) combined the two theories
to interpret the replacement of one dynasty by another.37 The famous
32 Du ET AL., supra note 17 at 314, 325.
33 Y. Yu, Viewing the Modern Signifigance of Chinese Culture in the Light of Values, in ZNONG-
GUO SIXIANG CHUANTONG DE XIANDAI QUANSHI [THE MODERN INTERPRETATION OF CHINESE
INTELLECTUAL TRADITION] 23 (1987).
34 Chang, The Doctrine of Man and Nature in Chinese Philosophy, in 1987 ZHONGGUO WENHUA
YU ZHONGGUO ZHEXUE 51 (1988) [CHINESE CULTURE AND CHINESE PHILOSOPHY]. Alone
among Confucian scholars, Kuang Xun once raised the opposite idea, "Better to utilize the rules of
the universe by controlling them than trust to luck through the eulogy of Heaven." It is doubtful if
this idea was recognized by Chinese people.
35 Hu Shih, The Scientific Spirit and Method in Chinese Philosophy, in THE CHINESE MIND:
ESSENTIALS OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY AND CULTURE 108, 126 (Charles A. Moore ed., 1967).
36 Id. at 108.
37 Liu, Acceleration and Counteraction: the Two-Force and Five-Element Theory and Chinese
TraditionalS&T, in GANGTAI Ji HAIWAI XUEZHE LUN ZHONGGUO WENHA [II THE DISCUSSIONS
OF CHINESE CULTURE BY SCHOLARS IN HONG KONG, TAIWAN, AND OVERSEAS] 472-79 (1988).
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Confucian philosopher Zhongshu Dong (179-104 BC) expanded the
"man is an integral part of the universe" theory [Tianren Heyi] with the
two-force and five-element theory.38 To Dong, the fundamental princi-
ples for prince and minister, for father and son, and for husband and
wife, were all derived from the way of yin (inferior) and yang (supe-
rior).39 This theory, which was originally used for politics, was later ap-
plied to everything in the world.
Yin and yang were described as being two complementary yet antag-
onistic concepts in a unit or in a thing, similar to the saying "There are
two sides of a coin."' The five elements were five kinds of changes, or
relations, or states of things, rather than five substantial elements of
things. The five-element theory explained the acceleration and counter-
action which occur in the development of things."1 In short, yin and yang
were the first principle of all things. "These two principles express them-
selves through the medium of the Five [Elements], with which all things
in the world correspond."'4 2
Joseph Needham, probably the most famous historian of Chinese
science and technology, claimed that the two-force and five-element the-
ory supported rather than undermined the development of scientific
thought in China.4 3 Although the two-force and five-element theory con-
tained certain reasonable principles,' it was normally applied through
analogy.45 In fact, ancient Chinese scholars employed analogy exten-
sively.4 6 Needham asserts that "[e]ssentially the Chinese method was an-
38 Cai, The Boundary of Heaven and Man, in TIANDAO Yu RENDAO [THE DOCTRINE OF
HEAVEN AND THE DOCTRINE OF MAN] 292, 293 (1982).
39 Wing-tsit Chan, The Story of Chinese Philosophy, in THE CHINESE MIND: ESSENTIALS OF
CHINESE PHILOSOPHY AND CULTURE, supra note 35, at 51.
40 Cf. T'ang Chiin-i, The Individual and the World in Chinese Methodology, in THE CHINESE
MIND: ESSENTIALS OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY AND CULTURE, supra note 35, at 267.
41 Liu, Interrelation and Harmony: Factors Affecting Science and Technology Development, in II
THE DISCUSSIONS OF CHINESE CULTURE BY SCHOLARS IN HONG KONG, TAIWAN, AND OVER-
SEAS, supra note 37, at 518. See also B. HE & G. HE, ZHONGGUO KEJISHI GAILUN [THE SURVEY
OF CHINESE SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY HISTORY] 14, 20 (1983).
42 Chan, supra note 39, at 52.
43 Sivin, supra note 3, at 56.
44 Traditional Chinese medicine which has been based on this theory for millennia is still studied
seriously by many peoples in the world today. In April, 1991, for example, more than 220 scholars
from Japan, the United States, the Soviet Union, Italy, and Indonesia went to Nanyang County,
China, for the Symposium on Jingzhong Zhang's theory. See Zhang, The Sage of Medicine and the
21st Century, PEOPLE'S DAILY, July 18, 1991, at 2 (overseas ed.). Jingzhong Zhang (150-219) was a
traditional Chinese medical doctor.
45 Liu, supra note 37, at 478-81, 486-87, 491, 493-94, 503. See also B. HE & G. HE, supra note
41, at 18-19, 26-28, 30-31, 152-55, 184-85; see also NEUING JIANGYI [BEIJING INSTITUTE OF TRADI-
TIONAL CHINESE MEDICINE, THE TEACHING MATERIAL OF INTERNAL CHANNELS] 3-20 (1966).
46 ZHONGYUAN SUN, ZHONGGUO LUOJI SHI (XIANQIN) [A HISTORY OF CHINESE LOGIC
(BEFORE QIN DYNASTY)] 58, 61 (1987). See also Liu, supra note 37, at 522; cf. ZHONGGUO FALU
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alogical-like causes bring like effects, as it was then so it is now, and so
it will be for ever. This faith was profound."'47 However, the fruitfulness
of analogy depends on whether any testable consequences can be de-
duced from the analogy. Without the tests, independent of the analogy,
to support conclusions resulting from the analogy, the analogy is precari-
ous. Let us see an example.
Kuo Shen (1032-1096) was a famous Chinese scientist. He summa-
rized Chinese scientific and technological achievements in his book,
Talks with Pen at Dream Brook [Mengxi Bitan].48 He was the first one in
the world to observe and record the phenomenon that if we put iron into
a solution of cupric sulfate and heat the solution, the solution will be-
come ferric sulfate, and copper will deposit on the surface of the iron.
Yet to explain the chemical reaction, he quoted a passage from an an-
cient medical book, Internal Channels [Neiing]: "According to the
Chapter Yellow Emperor, Daily Life Questions [Huangdi, Shuwen],
'There are five elements in the sky and five elements on the ground. The
air of earth is damp in the sky. The earth can produce metal, so can the
damp.' Here [the copper produced from the solution] is the proof of this
theory." His full conviction of the five-element theory stopped him from
probing into the essence of the chemical reaction.49
While it might be reasonable for the two-force and five-element the-
ory to emphasize the interrelationship of things and view things in their
totality, it is certainly unreasonable to de-emphasize the significance of
exploring the individual parts or elements of things.50 The two-force and
five-element theory encouraged neither the procuration of scientific data
nor the prediction of coming events; it mainly encouraged the interpreta-
tion of existing phenomena."' Moreover, it threw light on phenomena
not in terms of specific physics, chemistry, etc., but in terms of the ab-
stract two forces-yin and yang -and five elements-metal, wood,
water, fire and earth. Conspicuously lacking in analytical method, this
SIXIANG SHI [EDITING GROUP OF "A HISTORY OF CHINESE LEGAL THOUGHT," EDITING DE-
PARTMENT OF THE LEGAL TEXTBOOK, A HISTORY OF CHINESE LEGAL THOUGHT] 167, 168 (G.
Zhang ed., 1983); see also Cal, supra note 38, at 322.
47 NEEDHAM, supra note 30, at 244.
48 Qian, The Outstanding Scientist in Song Dynasty, Kuo Shen, in ZHONGGUO KEXUE GISHU
FAMIN HE KEXUE GISHu RENWU LUNjI [SELECTED ESSAYS OF CHINESE SCIENTIFIC AND TECH-
NOLOGICAL INVENTIONS, SCIENTISTS, AND TECHNICIANS] 303 (1955).
49 B. HE & G. HE, supra note 41, at 27.
SO Liu, supra note 37, at 472, 503, 524. With the development of modern science in the West, the
dualism of mind and matter, raised by Plato (427?- 347 BC) and completed by Descartes, has been
challenged in this century. China was profoundly non-Cartesian. Joseph Needham puts forward the
provocative idea that the ancient Chinese perspective on science may make a valuable contribution
to the dualism problem facing advanced S&T today.
51 Liu, supra note 37, at 472, 504.
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theory is not suitable for modem science.5 2
B. The Limited Role of the Methodologies
The lack of methodologies for scientific inquiry is apparently a di-
rect reason for the absence of the revolution of science and technology in
traditional China. Yet, in discussing the traditions which might be inimi-
cal to the PRC's Patent Law, we should also see that the significance of
the inquiring method is limited.
Methodologies, instead of being independent of people's beliefs or
ideas about a scientific issue, always change as the issue changes. There
seems to be no sharp line between the content of science and the method
of science. People's knowledge of some method alone can never guaran-
tee an actual scientific inquiry.5" For example, Westerners did not fully
realize the significance of Euclid's Elements until the late Renaissance; it
was the Arabic people who were more and earlier interested in this mas-
terpiece (although no scientific revolution ever took place in Arabic soci-
ety). 4 The method of scientific inquiry should be derived from, and
adapted to, the specific subject matter of the science rather than bor-
rowed from some rational discipline. Denis Diderot (1713-1784) stated
that:
If one were to undertake to teach a child to speak by starting with the
words that begin with A, then by proceeding to those that begin with B,
etc., half a lifetime could go by before the child would finish the alphabet.
Method is excellent in the realm of reasoning, but in my estimation it is
detrimental in the case of natural history in general and in botany in
particular.
55
Moreover, the method of scientific inquiry presupposed notions of
rationalizing the scientific work.56 For one thing, a hypothesis is a pre-
requisite for collecting facts relevant to the scientific work, for the facts
are always too numerous to collect. The most difficult part of scientific
work is to frame the hypothesis, and there has never been a method by
which a hypothesis could be induced. 7 In other words, the hypothesis,
the first and the most difficult step in the course of scientific work, de-
pends on people's beliefs or ideas of the issue to be proved, not people's
knowledge of the method to be applied.
Indisputably, people who discover their theories through a "guess"
52 Liu, supra note 37, at 472.
53 HILARY PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH AND HISTORY 191-93 (1982).
54 BERTRAND RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 212 (1945).
55 ERNST CASSIRER, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT 76-77 (1960).
56 PUTNAM, supra note 53, at 195.
57 RUSSELL, supra note 54, at 544-45.
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or "hunch" present the theories to the public only after they have proved
the theories with certain method. Still, by following the method of scien-
tific inquiry, people might come to a number of conflicting conclusions
from examining the same phenomenon. Which conclusion is to be cho-
sen often depends on the person's prior experiences, beliefs, or ideas,
which are not necessarily the results of any experiment. 8 Hence, "Being
rational" does not necessarily mean "believing theories solely because
they are supported by carefully performed experiments." 9
Scientists may feel it is difficult, if not impossible, to name whatever
method they actually followed in their work. Perhaps they often dis-
cover new theories by "hunch":" it is the "hunch," the tiptop faculty of
mind, rather than "cold logic," which makes the best gamblers, the best
detectives, the best lawyers, the best judges and the best scientists.6'
Ernst Mach (1838-1916), a scientist as well as a philosopher, maintained:
The mental operation by which one achieves new concepts and which one
denotes generally by the inadequate name of induction is not a simple but
rather a very complicated process. Above all, it is not a logical process
although such processes can be inserted as intermediary and auxiliary links.
The principal effort that leads to the discovery for new knowledge is due to
abstraction and imagination.62
C. Discredited Theories
In addition to the limited role of methodologies, we should see fur-
ther that the traditional lack of methodologies is insignificant to the
PRC's Patent Law today. In the 1890's, the trend of anti-traditionalism
originated with the literati.63 Also at the end of the turn of the century,
methodologies for scientific inquiry were widely propagandized. 6 Fu
Yan (1853-1921), an outstanding scholar, criticized traditional Chinese
subjectivism and stood for the proposition that all truths were based on
experiences. His translations of Thomas Huxley's Evolution and Ethics
and John Mills' A System of Logic had deep repercussions in China. 6 In
58 Cf. THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 3, 4 (1970).
59 PUTNAM, supra note 53, at 196.
60 Cf. P. FRANK, PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE: THE LINK BETWEEN SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY
318 (1957).
61 Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: the Function of the "Hunch" in Judicial
Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274, 279 (1929).
62 FRANK, supra note 60, at 319.
63 Y. LIN, The Anti-Traditionalism Thought of May Fourth Movement and Chinese Ideological
Crisis, in SIXIANG YU RENWU [THOUGHTS AND PERSONAGES] 125 (1985).
64 Cf Duan, The Three Forms of the Development of A Scientific Outlook in Modern China, 6
HISTORY STUDIES 111, 119, 120 (1990).
65 Id. at 111, 113-16.
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1911, with the collapse of the Qing Dynasty, traditional philosophies,
like the two-force and the five-element theory, lost their political support.
In China, the May Fourth Movement is often considered to be a
Chinese Renaissance or Enlightenment.66 Advocated vigorously by New
Youth and other magazines, anti-traditionalism became a strong ten-
dency.67 Anti-traditionalism has appeared in other countries and in
other times, but in terms of the extension of its coverage, the May Fourth
Movement's anti-traditionalism seems unique in world history.68 The
New Youth advocated materialism and atheism against superstition and
asserted that science was the only approach to the cosmos. 69 The May
Fourth Movement brought the spirit and the method of scientific inquiry
into Chinese culture.70 Hu Shih even propagated the slogans "Re-assess-
ing the values of everything" and "Better to make mistakes because of
doubt than because of belief."
'7 1
"Mr. Science" was idealized: it became the motivating force for the
leading scholars to advocate a new culture.72 Though the advocacy of
"Mr. Science" might have been superficial, some musty ideas were swept
away,7 3 and Chinese science and technology entered a new period.74 In
the changed society, most people turned to modern sciences like mathe-
matics and physics. Theories based on observable facts and positive data
became required by commercial production and by science and technol-
ogy. Today there might be some people who still believe the two-force
and five-element theory, but such unscientific theories have been gener-
ally discredited.
Does the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) favor ideas such as the
two-force and five-element theory? To be sure, there are some similari-
ties between the two-force and five-element theory and Marxist dialec-
tics. Both theories categorically assert that the world is governed by
66 Zhang, The Difference between Chinese and Western Philosophy with Respect to the Principle of
Subjectivity, in ZHONGGUO WENHUA YU ZHONGGUO ZHEXUE [CHINESE CULTURE AND CHINESE
PHILOSOPHY] 68 (Tang ed., 1988). See also Ting, Chen Tu-hsiu and the "New Youth," 5 HISTORY
STUDIES 37, 44 (1979).
67 Lin, Radical Iconoclasm in the May Fourth Period and the Future of Chinese Liberalism, in
SIXIANG Yu RENWU [THOUGHTS AND PERSONAGES] 143 (1985).
68 LIN, supra note 63, at 128.
69 Ting, supra note 66, at 37, 41-42.
70 Duan, supra note 64, at 111, 118-19.
71 Geng, Hu Shih's Role in the New Culture Movement, 5 HISTORY STUDIES 59, 69.
72 Duan, supra, note 64, at 111, 119.
73 Fan, supra note 15, at 39, 46. See also Geng, The Problems of the Eastern and the Western
Culture Today, in ZHONGGUO CHUANTONG WENHUA ZAUIANTAO II [II THE RE-REFLECTIONS
ON CHINESE TRADITIONAL CULTURE] 244 (FUDAN UNIVERSITY HISTORY DEPARTMENT ed.,
1987).
74 Du ET AL., supra note 17, at 304.
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immutable laws. "The one employs the static formalism ofyin/yang the-
ory to explain cyclical flux; the other employs the dynamic formalism of
the theory of contradictions to explain struggle and progression.""5 But,
except for traditional Chinese medicine, the two-force and five-element
theory is virtually meaningless to the modern science and technology
wanted by the CCP. Nor could this discredited theory be used to oppose
Western bourgeois philosophy. Consequently, this theory is normally
taken as a feudal superstition to be discarded or criticized as the rotten
ideology of the landlord class. Therefore, no matter how science and
technology developed in the PRC, theories like yin/yang could hardly be
counted as plural contributing factors.
It seems that the "traditional culture" commonly believed to be a
burden on China's modernization of science and technology and, in turn,
on the PRC's Patent Law, should not refer to the Chinese traditional
scientific inquiry. It might mean what is contained in the discussion
infra.
III. THE TRADITIONS AND THE MONARCHIC REGIME
While the scientist Einstein emphasized the significance of the meth-
odology for scientific inquiry, the historian Needham approached tie is-
sue of scientific and technological development differently:
All historians, no matter what their theoretical inclinations and prejudices,
are necessarily constrained to admit that the rise of modem science oc-
curred par! passu with the Renaissance, the Reformation and the rise of
capitalism. It is the intimate connection between the social and economic
changes on the one hand and the success of the 'new, or experiment' science
on the other which are the most difficult to pin down.
7 6
The situation in traditional China was different from that in the
West, but consistent with Needham's comment. The stagnant situation
of science and technology (here I mean the absence of a breakthrough
from the ancient style to the modern) did historically goparipassu with
the stagnant ideology (Confucianism as the dominating ideology), the
politics (the centralized and bureaucratized monarchy), and the economy
(the self-sufficient agricultural economy). The impact of traditions and
the monarchic regime behind them appears to have been less direct upon
innovation than it was upon scientific methodologies; however, the im-
pact might have been even more profound. Moreover, this impact might
linger today in a way and be inimical to the Patent Law.
75 Baum, Science and Culture in Contemporary China: the Roots of Retarded Modernization,
22:12 ASIAN SURVEY 1166, 1172 (1982).
76 NEEDHAM, supra note 30, at 192.
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A. Traditions Ignored Science and Technology while Stressed Politics
and the Humanities
As discussed above, science and technology became respectable at
the beginning of this century in China. Even before Deng came to
power, the PRC government under Mao Zedong paid certain attention to
science and technology. Accordingly, the possible tradition of ignoring
science and technology seems not very significant to the PRC's Patent
Law. However, the socialist regime under Mao might have shared some
fundamental characteristics with the monarchic regime, to the extent
that the socialist regime might have ignored science and technology indi-
rectly because it instead chose to stress politics. In order to understand
the Chinese people's values with which the PRC's Patent Law is cur-
rently confronted, we should discuss these traditions.
1. "Bizarre Craft and Cunning Work" vs. the Official Career
In traditional China, the orthodoxy, Confucianism, was not hostile
to science and technology." On the other hand, science and technology
never gained a respectable status either. It was generally believed that
without politics or the humanities as the core of scholarship, study would
lead to something vulgar, like technology and craftsmanship [jiyi],
which were looked down upon by society.7" Taoism, one of the major
schools of thought in ancient China, asserted, "If people possess too
many efficient instruments, the country will become fatuous; if people
possess too many crafts, [ominous] peculiarities will multiply." Of all
schools of thought in ancient China, Mohism favored science and tech-
nology most. But even this school maintained an extremely pragmatic
viewpoint, so as to be unfavorable to the development of science and
technology.
79
While ignoring science and technology, the Chinese tradition
stressed politics. Logic is essential to scientific and technological devel-
opment. Let us take the study of logic as an example to see the politics-
oriented values. Mojing was written in the 4th-3rd centuries B.C. by
Mohists. The Mohists lay emphasis on the connotations of concepts,
judgement and inferences rather than on the forms in logical structure.80
To justify the killing of robbers, they raised the notorious inference: "To
77 Yu, supra note 33, at 16-17.
78 Cf Qian, Chinese Intellectuals, in II THE DISCUSSIONS OF CHINESE CULTURE By SCHOLARS
IN HONG KONG, TAIWAN, AND OVERSEAS, supra note 37, at 443.
79 Ye, supra note 18, at 88.
80 Z. ZHU, MOJINGZHONGDE Luon XUESHUO [LOGICAL THEORIES IN MOST CLASSICS] 178,
182 (1988).
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love robbers is not to love men. To dislike robbers is not to dislike men.
To kill robbers is not to kill men.""1 Mohists confused the biological
meaning of "men" with the social meaning of "robbers." Similarly,
Kuang Xun, a famous Confucian scholar, and Han Fei (280-233 B.C.), a
famous representative of the Legalist School, one of the major schools of
thought then, confused their political opinions with their study of logic.
So did the scholars of Eclectics, another contemporary school of
thought.
8 2
In Chinese intellectual history, the traditional culture has undergone
drastic change twice: first, during the periods of Spring and Autumn
(770-476 B.C.) and Warring States (475-221 B.C.) and second, during
the 1919 May Fourth Movement period (as discussed, supra).13 During
the period of Spring and Autumn and Warring States, the monarchical
structure was changing from an enfeoffment system to a centralized and
bureaucratized system. Many schools of thought as well as many na-
tional states emerged, fighting against each other. However, even under
such turbulent circumstances, there was the prevailing tendency-to
subordinate academic studies to political doctrines.
84
Among Needham's comments on the tradition of stressing social
sciences was that "it would really be true to say that in Chinese culture,
history was the 'queen of the sciences', not theology or metaphysics of
any kind, never physics or mathematics."8 " In terms of academic ap-
proach, it seems to be true, as John Fairbank (1907-1991), the premier
Sinologist in the United States, asserted, that of all peoples in the world,
the Chinese people are most inclined to view themselves in a historical
perspective.86 In terms of the content of Chinese culture, it seems to be
more impressive that the Chinese philosophy was primarily ethics-ori-
ented and politics-oriented. Chinese philosophy meant little in develop-
ing transcendent theory, pure science, and logic, but it meant much in
cultivating people's social practice and guiding governmental activity.
7
81 SUN, supra note 46, at 259, 261-62.
82 SUN, supra note 46, at 355, 361, 402, 427. See also W. ZHUO, ZHOUGUO LuonI SIXIANG
SHIGAO [A DRAFT OF CHINESE LOGICAL THOUGHT HISTORY] 20, 24, 401, 427 (1979).
83 J. Hu, ZHONGGUO JINDAI JINGJI SIXIANGSHI DAGANG [A CONCISE MODERN HISTORY OF
CHINESE ECONOMIC THOUGHT) 377 (1984).
84 Cf. SUN, supra note 46, at 402, 427. See also ZHUO, supra note 82, at 11-12; Z. LI,
ZHOUGHUA FAXI [I CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM] 56-57 (1985).
85 NEEDHAM, supra note 30, at 242.
86 J. FAIRBANK & E. REISCHAUER, CHINA, TRADITION & TRANSFORMATION 2 (1978).
87 Cheng, The Characterictics of Chinese Philosophy, in Gangtai Ji Haiwai Xuezhe Lun Zhong-
guo Wenhua 1 [I THE DISCUSSIONS OF CHINESE CULTURE BY SCHOLARS IN HONG KONG, TAI-
WAN, AND OVERSEAS] 286-87, 291 (1988).
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Chinese rulers normally ignored technology and invention. 8 In Chi-
nese history there were countless books dealing with politics or the hu-
manities, but far less dealing with technology. 89 Scientists, technicians
and artisans were often nameless, with their talents buried in oblivion.90
Almost all scientific works were ignored.91 Mainly in the hand of arti-
sans, technology and inventions emerged of themselves and perished of
themselves. With few scholars devoting themselves to science, few scien-
tific rules were abstracted from the innumerable discoveries and
inventions.92
Science and technology were derogatorily referred to as "bizarre
craft and cunning work" [qii yinjiao], particularly by the ruling class.
This attitude seems nowhere better illustrated than by the story of Yingx-
ing Song (1587-1667). Song wrote Tiangong Kaiwu, an encyclopedic
work on the Chinese agriculture and handicraft industry, which symbol-
ized an unprecedented zenith in the history of Chinese science and tech-
nology. No book in the world up to then could match this masterpiece in
that field, and it was circulated in Japan and Europe. Darwin (1800-
1882) called Tiangong Kaiwu the "authoritative work." Needham calls
Song "the Diderot of China."
For all his intelligence, however, Song desired the official career that
attracted many other Chinese scholars. From the age of 29 until he was
45 he took the imperial examinations-the way to an official career-five
times. Having felt it was hopeless to pass the examination, he began,
with much hesitation, to write Tiangong Kaiwu while working in an in-
ferior office. In about 1780, the Qing government tried to collect all
books in China for re-publication under censorship. The corpus of the
publication is titled Sikuquanshu. Song's Tiangong Kaiwu, published in
1637, was excluded from Sikuquanshu for suspected "anti-Qing Govern-
ment ideas." Since then, the work has not been reissued. At the begin-
ning of this century, Chinese scholars had to rely on the 1771 Japanese
edition of this work for study, because they could not find the original
Chinese edition. At the beginning of the 1950's, the sole extant copy of
the original edition in Chinese was fortunately found. The location of
88 Zhang, The Drawback of the Governmental Policy of Choosing the Talent in Traditional China,
PEOPLE'S DAILY, Dec. 25, 1986, at 2 (overseas ed.).
89 j. PAN, YINGXING SONG, MINGDAI KEXUEJIA SONGYINGXING [THE SCIENTIST IN MING
DYNASTY] 117 (1981).
90 Mao, Preface to ANCIENT CHINA'S TECHNOLOGY AND SCIENCE 3 (The Institute of the His-
tory of Natural Science, Chinese Academy of Sciences ed., 1983).
91 Hu, The Book of ZHOU YI CAN TONG QI in the History of Science in China, 14 ZHONGGUO
ZHEXUE [CHINESE PHILOSOPHY] 87 (1988).
92 Ye, supra note 18, at 88.
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Song's tomb has remained unknown.9 3 Since the tradition of ignoring
science and technology was so strong, it is not surprising that in the pref-
ace of his Tiangong Kaiwu, Song emotionally wrote, "An ambitious
scholar will undoubtedly toss this book onto his desk and give it no fur-
ther thought: it is a work that is in no way concerned with the art of
advancement in officialdom." 94
2. The Monarchic Regime behind the Traditions
Although world-wide patent systems originated in Europe, Europe-
ans were not as keen about science and technology in the Middle Ages as
they are today. Until the 16th century, much like the situation in tradi-
tional China in a sense, in Europe there was "the predominance of the
Schoolmen and dons, immersed in books, faced toward the past, and ori-
ented toward human institutions rather than toward Nature." 95 It was
the great Renaissance and the great Enlightenment which tremendously
exalted the status of science and technology. Meanwhile, we have wit-
nessed another kind of approval-the governmental involvement, with-
out which there could hardly be a general interest and long-standing
respect for innovation.
In the later Middle Ages when many rival national states co-existed,
the individual centers of competing political power had a great deal to gain
from introducing technological changes that promised commercial or in-
dustrial advantage and, hence, greater government revenues, and much to
lose from allowing others to introduce them first. Once it was clear that
one or another of the competing centers would always let the genie out of
the bottle, the possibility of aligning political power with the economic sta-
tus quo and against technological change more or less disappeared from the
Western mind.9 6
Along with business, science and technology became respectable. The
scientific research of Robert Boyle (1627-1691), for example, was indi-
rectly supported by some merchants and industrialists. Even in the royal
court of Great Britain, scientific and technological experiments were per-
formed under the aegis of King Charles II (1630-1685): "the noise of
mechanic instruments resounded in the Whitehall itself."97
Social need and the government policy were favorable to a patent
93 J. PAN, YINGXING SONG, MINGDAI KEXUEJIA SONGYINGXING [THE SCIENTIST IN MING
DYNASTY] 41, 44, 54, 70-71, 100-01, 128, 133-48 (1981).
94 SUNG YING-HSING, T'IEN-KUNG K'AI-Wu, CHINESE TECHNOLOGY IN THE SEVENTEENTH
CENTURY XIV (E. Sun & S. Sun trans., 1966).
95 Sivin, supra note 3, at 57.
96 NATHAN ROSENBERG & LUTHER E. BIRDZELL, HOW THE WEST GREW RICH: THE ECO-
NOMIC TRANSFORMATION OF THE INDUSTRIAL WORLD 137-38 (1986).
97 Needham, supra note 30, at 136-37.
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law. Early in the reign of Edward III (1312-1377) in Britain, patents
were granted to some Continental technicians to promote British indus-
try. In 1474, the Venice Republic enacted a patent act. In the 16th cen-
tury, the German and Swiss governments granted patents to inventors.
In the 17th century, the British Parliament enacted a relatively compre-
hensive patent act. At the end of the 18th century, the United States and
France enacted formal and comprehensive patent acts. Patent systems
promoted the industrial development in those countries.98
No such situation emerged in traditional China. In the self-suffi-
cient agricultural society, the Chinese did not necessarily want advanced
science and technology. For most of her history, China was under a sin-
gle monolithic government. The co-existence of two or more rival na-
tion-states was rare, and even more rare was competition between rival
nation-states spurring scientific and technological development.
Although controlling, guiding, and even promoting the development of
science and technology in various degrees,9 9 the Chinese government did
not show respect for science and technology. The countries around this
Celestial Empire were less developed and the Chinese were proud of their
culture as the center of the world."° The intrepid nomadic tribes in the
north sometimes posed a serious threat to Chinese territory, but few Chi-
nese thought to settle this problem through the employment of science
and technology. Thus, the situation was not that the Chinese tried in
vain to create a scientific and technological revolution, but that they sim-
ply did not bother about it.
Montesquieu (1689-1755) believed that "[t]he most natural, inter-
mediate and subordinate power, is that of the nobility. This in some
measure seems to be essential to a monarchy, whose fundamental maxim
is, no monarch, no nobility; no nobility, no monarch; but there may be a
despotic prince."' 01 That was not the case in China. In Chinese history
there were few emperors who were so tyrannical as Zheng Ying (259-210
B.C.), an emperor of the Qin Dynasty (221-207 B.C.). On the other
hand, under the Qin Dynasty the enfeoffment system had been abolished.
From that period forward, there were practically no feudal lords, no no-
bility. Powerful church and bourgeois classes were also absent. There
was no real political faction in Chinese society opposing, or independent
98 DONG, supra note 12, at 1-5.
99 Du ET AL., supra note 17, at 114, 319.
100 Song, The Traditional Society and the New Literati, in ZHISHI FENZI YU ZHONGGUO [THE
LITERATI AND CHINA] 91 (Zhou ed., 1987); see also Ding & Du, An Elementary Analysis of the
Factors in Capitalist Modernization in China and Japan during the Nineteenth Century, 1 HISTORY
STUDIES 44-45 (1983).
101 MONTESQUIEU, I THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 14 (T. Nugent trans., 1823).
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from, the central governments. I"2 Perhaps the Confucianism at bottom
checked the later emperors, who might otherwise have been the "des-
potic prince[s]" as Montesquieu thought. 10 3 Still, compared with its
Western counterpart, the bureaucratized and centralized Chinese govern-
ment wielded far greater power over the society. 04 Naturally, in such a
unified society, what the Chinese government wanted was not some ad-
vanced science and technology, nor some patent law, but loyal and duti-
ful subjects, upon whom it could base a stable position. 105
Although Chinese society was highly unified, there was still a poten-
tial opponent to the government-the literati. It was feared that these
individuals might refuse to be the government's "yes men," pursuing in-
stead the ideal politics advocated by Confucius.106 Therefore, one of the
government's primary tasks was to control as well as to utilize the lite-
rati, either by open force, by instillation of the ideologized Confucianism,
or by attractive official careers.
10 7
In the West in the Middle Ages, Christianity, though occasionally
supported by the secular goverment, was primarily an independent au-
thority. There was no omnipresent ideology supporting the secular gov-
ernment as did Confucianism in China; nor was there a learning leading
to an official career as did the learning of Confucian classics in China.108
After the revision by Zhongshu Dong in the Western Han Dynasty (224-
06 B.C.), Confucianism was characterized by an emphasis on authority
and discipline.109 Henceforth, the government tried to control people by
Confucianism, which was later further ideologized. In particular, the
government encouraged the literati to enter upon an official career
through passing the imperial examination based on Confucian classics.
The imperial examination system was established in the Sui Dynasty
(581-618) and lasted until 1903. It is said that, looking at the scholars
having passed the imperial examination walking in line, Shimin Li (597-
649), the famous emperor of the Tang Dynasty (618-907), complacently
102 Cf. B. MOORE, SOCIAL ORIGINS OF DICTATORSHIP AND DEMOCRACY 181 (1966).
103 Cf. EDGAR BODENHEIMER, JURISPRUDENCE, THE PHILOSOPHY AND METHOD OF THE LAW
183 (1974).
104 Wang, Characteristics of Chinese Feudal Society, 1 HISTORY STUDIES 8 (1985).
105 Hu, supra note 91, at 86-87.
106 Xu, The Tragic Fate of The Chinese Literati under the Changing Situation, in THE LITERATI
AND CHINA, supra note 100, at 71-75.
107 Mou, The Fate of Chinese Literati, in THE LITERATI AND CHINA, supra note 100, at 60-62.
See also Li, On the Literati, in THE LITERATI AND CHINA, supra note 100, at 11-13.
108 THE MODERNIZATION OF CHINA 195 (G. Rozman ed., 1981).
109 Yu, Anti-Intellectualism and the Chinese Political Tradition, in I THE DISCUSSIONS OF CHI-
NESE CULTURE BY SCHOLARS IN HONG KONG, TAIWAN, AND OVERSEAS, supra note 87, at 340-41.
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said, "All the elite under heaven have fallen into my trap!' 110
The people, particularly the literati, had few ways to acquire fame
and wealth under a bureaucratized and centralized monarchy. Choosing
an official career by studying Confucian classics and taking the imperial
examination was the most honorable and most profitable way. 1
Although few could succeed in this process, the mere possibility con-
vinced the public that the imperial examination system was justifiable. 112
While majoring in Confucian classics, some Chinese scholars also studied
astronomy, geography, medicine, mathematics, and other subjects, for
sometimes these subjects were still held to be valuable.113 Nevertheless,
though science and technology associated with service of the state or the
community were respected, the public normally belittled those who made
a living through these areas. 1 4 Land obviously meant status in tradi-
tional China, but, not having a primogeniture system for property, a
wealthy family might decline in a few generations. The best way to make
a family prosperous was still to make the son study Confucian classics
and follow an official career. I15 That is precisely why an old and popular
proverb admired Confucian classics: "In books there are golden houses.
In books there is plenty of grain. In books there are beautiful women."
It is noteworthy that, compared with the West, science and technol-
ogy developed much earlier in China. However, this earlier development
was followed by a prolonged stagnation instead of modernization. This
situation reminds us of what Max Weber (1864-1920), the famous soci-
ologist, maintained: in the interest of dynastic continuity, a monarchy's
primary goal was political stability, and the monarchic order "was the
death of capitalist development and of everything dependent on it." (By
"capitalist development," Weber meant the development with which the
capital was the private acquisitive capital used for profit in an exchange
economy.) 16 Weber's comment is particularly true in China, where the
monarchy was far more powerful and stable than its Western
counterpart.
It seems that the monarchic order is a fundamental cause of the
Chinese traditions which ignored science and technology while stressing
110 Li, "Gouzhong" is not "Guzhong," ENLIGHTENMENT DAILY [GUANGMIA RIBAO], March 25,
1993, at 6.
111 Song, supra note 100, at 100-01.
112 THE MODERNIZATION OF CHINA, supra note 108, at 189.
113 Du ET AL., supra note 17, at 318.
114 THE MODERNIZATION OF CHINA, supra note 108, at 196.
115 S. WANG & Y. Xu, ZHONGGUO FAZHI SHIGANG [THE OUTLINE OF CHINESE LEGAL HIS-
TORY] 114 (1986). See also MOORE, supra note 102, at 169-70.
116 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY LIV. (G. Roth & C. Wittich ed., 1978).
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politics and the humanities. If these traditions, or rather if the monar-
chic order, lingers today, a significant role for the Patent Law is unlikely.
B. The Traditions Scorning Commercial Profit while Insisting on
Confucian Morality
Beaumont comments on the Chinese tradition relevant to the Patent
Law, that "ITIhe notions of commercial advantage and profitability have
not only been absent in China, but they were and continue to be in con-
tradiction with the whole humanist tradition of China." '17 That is a dis-
couraging comment: commercial profit is crucial to a patent system, for
patenting relies upon commercial profit gained from the exclusive rights
in the invention. Weber had a somewhat different idea:
The notion that our rationalistic and capitalistic age is characterized by a
stronger economic interest than other periods is childish; the moving spirit
of modem capitalism is not possessed of a stronger economic impulse than,
for example, an oriental trader."
1 8
It is certain that the impulse to acquire goods and the pursuit of self
interests through the accumulation of money are by no means unique to
capitalism. 9 However, at different times and in different societies there
might be different values or a different ethos affecting those impulses. As
Weber pointed out, people might want to live simply as they were accus-
tomed to live instead of making more money than necessary; 120 or, in the
spirit of "Make tallow out of cattle and money out of men," people might
want to make as much money as they could. 121 That is to say, the im-
pulse to make money among different peoples and in different times
might be weaker or stronger because of different values. Beaumont may
well be correct that the notions of commercial advantage and profitabil-
ity are incompatible with Chinese traditions.
1. The Impulse to Commercial Profit Smothered by Confucianism
Until the later Spring and Autumn period (770-476 B.C.), the Chi-
nese generally agreed that "Righteousness exists for profit." 12 2 Unlike
the ancient Athenians, Chinese people thought much of commerce.
123
117 Beaumont, supra note 6, at 44.
118 ROSENBERG & BIRDZELL, supra note 96, at 11.
119 MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 17 (T. Parsons
trans., 1952).
120 Id. at 60.
121 Id. at 51.
122 EDITING GROUP OF 1 ZNONGGUO JINGJI SIXIANG JIANSHI [A CONCISE HISTORY OF CHI-
NESE ECONOMIC THOUGHT] 26 (1984).




Later, Confucius would say that, "the superior man is influenced by the
love of rectitude, the mean man by the love of gain."124 Mencius had a
more radical attitude on this point. Once he came to King Hui of Liang
State. The King said, "Venerable sir, since you have not counted it far to
come here, a distance of hundreds of miles, may I presume that you are
provided with counsels to profit my kingdom?" Mencius replied, "Why
must your Majesty use that word 'profit'? What I am provided with are
counsels to benevolence and righteousness, and these are my only
topics." 
125
Confucianism, or the doctrine of Confucius and Mencius, was the
orthodoxy in traditional China. The Confucian scholar Zhongshu Dong
stood for anti-utilitarianism: "Uphold righteousness, but not to seek
profit; clarify the [Confucian] doctrine, but not to calculate merits." '126
Another famous Confucian scholar, Xi Zhu (1130-1200), revised Con-
fucianism with Buddhistic asceticism. Zhu claimed, "In the field of the
mind, if the righteousness doctrine exists, human desire disappears; if
human desire wins, the righteousness doctrine disappears. ' 127 Such ideas
were taken as the Confucianism to be studied by all in later dynasties.128
In China, as well as in the classical world, there was no spirit like
"Make tallow out of cattle and money out of men."1 29 From the Western
Han Dynasty (206-24 B.C.) to the end of the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911),
both the royal court and the literati constantly emphasized the signifi-
cance of morality in the fields of politics, education, art, etc..1 30 When
estimating a person, the Chinese often emphasized his or her morality.31
The achievements made or the social status acquired might be secon-
dary." 2 Such a "moralized culture" is rare in world history.
1 33
124 THE FOUR BOOKS 74, 76 (D. Collice trans., 1970) (THE FOUR BOOKS is the common refer-
ence to a compilation of classical Chinese works).
125 MENCIUS, THE WORKS OF MENCIUS-THE CHINESE CLASSICS 125-26 (J. Legge trans.,
1949).
126 S. YE, 2 ZNONGGUO JINGJI SIXIANG JIANSHI [A CONCISE HISTORY OF CHINESE ECONOMIC
THOUGHT] 46 (1983).
127 LUNYU SHUZHENG [THE INTERPRETATION OF CONFUCIAN ANALECTS] 274 (S. Yang trans.,
1986).
128 D. CAO, ZHONGGUO CHUANTONG SIXIANG TANSUO [THE EXPLORATION OF CHINESE
TRADITIONAL THOUGHT] 236, 376-77 (1988). Although Zhu did not deny people's natural desires
absolutely, it was held in Chinese history that he did.
129 WEBER, supra note 119, at 51-52.
130 Song, supra note 100, at 89.
131 Qian, Historical Science and Literature in Chinese Cultural Tradition, in II THE DISCUSSIONS
OF CHINESE CULTURE BY SCHOLARS IN HONG KONG, TAIWAN, AND OVERSEAS, supra note 37, at
422, 433-44.
132 Qian, The Special Nature of Chinese Culture, in 1987 CHINESE CULTURE AND CHINESE PHI-
LOSOPHY, supra note 34, at 28.
133 Z. WEI, ZHONGGUO WENHUA GAILUN [THE SURVEY OF CHINESE CULTURE] 61 (1968).
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During the Middle Ages in the West, economic thought was closely
tied to morality. Similarly, in traditional China, Confucianism held that
commerce corroded morality and promoted avarice, so that commerce
should be restricted.134 Few scholars were free from the straitjacket of
Confucian morality. 135 Even talking about commercial profit was
deemed as degrading and improper behavior for a man of noble charac-
ter.136 In the Song Dynasty (960-1279), businessmen enjoyed an im-
proved status as a result of the development of trade.137 Still, the famous
poet You Lu (1125-1210) felt that "the pursuit of profit by doing busi-
ness" was "most shameful," and that wealthy businessmen were the
same as corrupt officials. He admonished his descendants never "to do
... like the Philistine." 131 After the 16th century, trade became more
important in China; however, the tradition of looking down upon busi-
nessmen remained.
139
Scholar Zhi Li (1527-1602) asserted, in one of his attacks on Con-
fucianism, that, "There has never been such a thing that the ancient sage
does not like wealth and high status." He believed that the values of
"taking 'commercial profit' as a taboo" seriously obstructed China's eco-
nomic development. Not surprisingly, he was charged with "unscrupu-
lously advocating heterodoxy to mislead the public opinion and the
people," and was sentenced to death in prison. 14 By the later 19th cen-
tury, many modem enterprises had already been established in China
and many scholars had already seriously criticized Confucian theory,
which embraced righteousness but denigrated profit-seeking. Nonethe-
less, when investing in enterprises, bureaucrats, landlords, or business-
men still tried to keep their names secret for fear of the image of pursuing
money.'41 Confucian theory lasted for 2000 years and contributed to the
stagnation of the Chinese economy during that entire period. 142
134 H. Hou, 2 ZHOUGGUO JINDAI JINGJI SIXIANG SHIGAO [A HISTORY OF MODERN CHINESE
ECONOMIC THOUGHT] 9 (1983).
135 J. Hu, 3 ZHONGGUO JINGJI SIXIANG SHI [A HISTORY OF CHINESE ECONOMIC THOUGHT]
705 (1962).
136 J. ZHAO & M. YI, ZHONGGUO JINDAI JINGJI SHIXIANG SHI [A MODERN HISTORY OF CHI-
NESE ECONOMIC THOUGHT] 13 (1980).
137 Ye, The Historical Transformation of the Concept of Commodity Economy-An Investigation
with the Song Dynasty as the Standpoint, 4 HISTORY STUDIES 139 (1989).
138 Tan, The Economical Elements in the Paternal Precepts in Ancient Time of China 2 ZHONG-
GUOSHI YANJIU [CHINESE HISTORY STUDIES] 10 (1986).
139 Y. YU, ZHONGGUO JINSHI ZOHGJIAO LUNLI YU SHANGREN JINGSHEN [CHINESE MODERN
RELIGIOUS ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF BUSINESSMEN] 57, 164 (1986).
140 Hu, supra note 83, at 395-97.
141 Ye, supra note 17, at 7, 16.
142 Z. WEI, RUJIA YU XIANDAIHUA [CONFUCIUNISM AND THE MODERNIZATION] 104 (1986).
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2. The Lack of A Bourgeois Class
In the West, since the later Middle Ages the orthodox views on
commerce had been changing. St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) admit-
ted that commerce was an unavoidable evil in an imperfect world.
143
John Calvin (1509-1564) and other Protestant scholars, many of whom
became businessmen, sanctioned the pursuit of commercial profit."
Long before Adam Smith (1723-1790), scattered groups in England's
countryside began to take the doctrine of self-interest and economic free-
dom as the natural foundation of human society. 145 Gradually, the acqui-
sition of money became the expression of socially admired personal
ability.
The change in traditional values from scorning commercial profit to
encouraging it was favored by the social circumstances and buttressed by
the rising bourgeois class. The short-lived empire of Charlemagne (742-
814) resulted in political pluralism, with power shared by a multitude of
local barons. From the 10th century on, a large number of towns and
cities emerged conformable to commercial development; urbanization
both presupposed and created commercial expansion; political and reli-
gious control relaxed in every sphere of life: economy, science, art, litera-
ture, education and others. 1" It was the conflicts between the bourgeois
class and the feudal lords, between the secular authority and the church,
between kings and nobles, between rival religions, and between rival na-
tion-states, which resulted in the general relaxation. The many-sided
competition helped the bourgeois class to break through the crust of
traditional society.147 Under such circumstances, the bourgeois class
grew more and more powerful and the tradition denigrating commercial
profit was replaced by a new one advocating commercial activity.148
In China, the bureaucratized and centralized monarchy, along with
ideologized Confucianism, existed despite the replacement of one dy-
nasty by another. The monarchy actually became more autocratic in the
last two-Ming (1368-1644) and Qing (1644-1911)-dynasties. 149 Justi-
fied by Confucian classics, the Chinese patriarchal family and hierarchi-
143 ERIC ROLL, A HISTORY OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT 45-47, 49 (1963).
144 RUSSELL, supra note 54, at 187-88.
145 MOORE, supra note 102, at 8.
146 ROSENBERG & BIRDZELL, supra note 96, at 24, 67, 79.
147 MOORE, supra note 102, at 174; see also ROSENBERG & BIRDZELL, supra note 96, at 132.
148 ROLL, supra note 143, at 58.
149 EDITING GROUP OF "A HISTORY OF CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM," EDITING DEPARTMENT OF
THE LEGAL TExTBooK, ZHONGGUO FAZHISHI [A HISTORY OF THE CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM] 3 (J.
Zhang ed., 1982).
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cal society were highly integrated and stabilized.15 ° Accordingly, the
Chinese communion of values and understandings was highly integrated
and stabilized."' There was no general relaxation in ideological control
like that in the West in the later Middle Ages, nor a movement revolu-
tionizing traditional values like the Renaissance or the Enlightenment.
China was a self-sufficient agricultural society. The basic productive
unit was the household. The typical economic activity was "the male
farming while the female weaved" [nanjing nuzhi]. Although trade grad-
ually played a more and more important role historically, the self-suffi-
cient economy was apparently dominant until the 1840 Opium War. For
example, produce rent was always the basic form of income for land-
lords, not money rent; produce and forced labor were always the major
form of taxes for the government, not money taxes. 152 There was a con-
spicuous lack of an independent bourgeois class, who would otherwise
have been the most powerful supporter of the pursuit of commercial
profit.
In China, a large number of cities and towns emerged during the
Spring and Autumn Period (770-476 B.C.) and the Warring States Pe-
riod (475-221 B.C.). Though cities and towns might have served as cen-
ters of commercial circulation, their primary purpose was to function as
a political and military center. All cities and towns were normally con-
trolled by the central government. The concept of "borough" or of the
autonomous city-state, like Venice or Genoa, was completely unknown.
The cities, even in the Warring States period, might have been ten times
larger in population than those in the West, but flourishing cities did not
here imply a developed industry. Unlike the situation in the later Middle
Ages in the West, in China the artisans and businessmen were the minor-
ity of the urban residents. The majority were government employees,
officials, military personnel, landlords, beggars and other consumers.
Economic activities in cities and towns were mainly commodity circula-
tion rather than production. And commodities were primarily made by
farmers rather than by professional handicraftsmen.' 3 Generally, Chi-
nese cities and towns were consumptive ones, not productive ones.'
5 4
In the West, no sooner had the large number of cities and towns
emerged, than the guilds were established to protect the interests of
150 T. CH'U, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRADITIONAL CHINA 280-81 (1961).
151 ROBERT M. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 95 (1977).
152 R. Hu, ZHONGGUO FENGJIAN SHEHUI XINGTAI YANJIU [THE STUDIES OF CHINESE FEU-
DAL SOCIETY FORMS] 167-68, 173 (1979).
153 Id. at 183, 245-55, 272.
154 Li, The Causes of the Stagnancy in the Structure of Chinese Feudal Society, GUANGMING
RIBAO [ENLIGHTENMENT DAILY], Jan. 9, 1985, at 3.
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handicraftsmen and traders. The first guild in China was established
during the Tang Dynasty (618-907), 1000 years after the emergence of a
large number of cities and towns. Until the 17th century, the Chinese
guilds were governmental tools to help supervise business and collect
taxes, rather than private organizations looking out for their own inter-
ests.1 55 These Chinese guilds were never strong. In the Song Dynasty
(960-1279), wealthy traders cared little about the governmental offi-
cials,' 5 6 but such things were rare in Chinese history. Consequently, in
order to protect themselves and to acquire a decent social status, the
Chinese traders generally had to gain support from the officials through
gifts or bribery. The officials did not take the traders as fearful oppo-
nents, instead despising them and using them as servants. 157 Compared
with the West, no urban commercial class nor manufacturing class ex-
isted in China, though at times some starts in this direction could be
found.'58 The Chinese traders were simply too weak to bring about a
spirit of entrepreneurship.
3. The Legal System Behind the Traditions
The legal system in traditional China is worth discussing, for among
other factors affecting the traditional values, the legal system is the most
relevant; in particular, it had a direct influence on the PRC's Patent Law.
Let us see first how the Western legal system favored the impulse to com-
mercial profit and, in turn, favored patent law, so that we may better
understand how the Chinese legal system discouraged such an impulse in
the past and how it contradicts an institution like the patent law today.
a. The Western Legal System
The Roman Law System (or Roman-Germanic Family of Law) was
created in the 12th and 13th centuries. It was theoretically based upon
the Roman Corpus Juris Civilis. European society, as it had done in the
ancient Roman Empire, again recognized the significance of law for so-
cial order, security and progress. The idea that society must be founded
on the law, an autonomy not to be confused with religion and morality,
has ever since been characteristic of Western civilization. The Roman
Law System and the Common Law System (or Anglo-American Legal
System) share these basic principles and settle problems in substantially
155 Hu, supra note 152, at 265-72.
156 Ye, supra note 137, at 139.
157 Yan, On the Physiocracy and the Policy of Restraining Commercial Activity in Feudal China, 4
HISTORY STUDIES 146 (1988).
158 MOORE, supra note 102, at 174.
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similar ways. The two systems are commonly called "one great family of
Western Law."
159
Western law not only gained unquestionable dignity, but also em-
phasized personal rights resulting from contracts. With respect to legal
history, Henry Maine (1822-1888), the famous historian of law, ob-
served, "[Tihe movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a
movement from Status to Contract." This celebrated dictum may well
be more suitable for property law than for others." But Maine did point
out the historical trend: social orders have been decided more and more
by individuals' free contracts than by their preexistent status. This his-
torical trend was incarnated, among others, by the famous 1804 French
Civil Code, which reflected the principles of equality, liberalism, inviola-
bility of private property, and the freedom of contract. 61 It may be
maintained that Western law essentially means civil law regulating pri-
vate relations between individuals; hence came the obligations, property,
and the like. The relations between abstractions such as companies, gov-
ernment entities, and even the governments themselves, might be de-
scribed by the framework for private relations. 162
More importantly, Western law emphasizing personal rights result-
ing from contracts has been morally justifiable. Jeremy Bentham (1748-
1832) viewed law as an autonomous field of study free from moral is-
sues.' 6 3 This utilitarian approach makes sense in a way. On the other
hand, people's general observance of law should not be explained by
compulsion or physical force. Some laws, like international law and con-
stitutional principles, even lack proper sanctions.164 The present-day
positivists admit that the law is not only a command from authority, but
that it also indicates certain values. The logical character of law does not
necessarily exclude its moral character; on the contrary, "[w]hat lan-
guage is to thought, norms are to values."
165
Does the law just passively embody people's morality, or does it also
have an active impact on people's morality? The answer is that law and
morality are interrelated and interact upon each other complexly, 166 and
the impact is not only one-way from morality to law. In other words, the
159 R. DAVID & J. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY 25, 39, 51,
(1985).
160 HENRY MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 422-23 (F. Pollock Introduction & Notes, 1861).
161 FAGUO MINFADIAN [FRENCH CIVIL CODE] iv-ix (Li, Wu & Sun trans., 1979).
162 Jones, An Approach to Chinese Law, REv. Soc. LAW 3 (1978).
163 DENNIS LLOYD, THE IDEA OF LAW 100 (1976).
164 A.P. D'ENTREVES, NATURAL LAW 88 (1967).
165 Id. at 79, 115.
166 LLOYD, supra note 163, at 67.
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development of law "from Status to Contract" was a response to the
change in people's mores as commerce and industry expanded. In addi-
tion, the development of law simultaneously fostered the new mores
which favored the pursuit of money. "The revival of Roman law was a
powerful leaven in the transformation of the social and political structure
of Europe."167 It seems impossible that the revival of Roman law had
nothing to do with the transformation of morality as well, although com-
mercial law might have been the pioneer in doing so.
Early in the 1 lth century, merchant guilds were set up in some Eu-
ropean cities. Independently from the government, they laid down rules
to settle their business disputes. From that time on, the commercial law
gradually took shape. The 13th century saw the famous Charte
D'oleron, a selection of 12th century maritime cases, come into being.168
In 1673, the first commercial act was enacted in France in the name of
Louis XIV (1638-1715), with 112 articles regulating companies, bills of
exchange, bankruptcy, etc. In the 18th century, the British common law
court, which had already tried cases of law merchants, formally made the
law merchant a part of the common law. Since the 19th century, com-
mercial laws have been enacted in most countries in Europe.
169
Commercial laws placed people in the dual position of debtor and
creditor. However, the implementation of commercial laws could not
depend merely upon coercive measures; it also required a moral system
for the fulfillment of commitments. "Each sphere of activity in a plural
society requires its own moral system."' 70 With the expansion of the
market, more and more people were involved in various businesses. The
development of commerce preceded the general growth of the modern
industry; the spread of commercial laws seems to have preceded the gen-
eral justification of the modern ethic that it is moral to pursue the great-
est possible amount of money. After all, "it was the practice that made
the Ethics."' 71
b. The Chinese Legal System
In traditional China, the legal system took form in the Western Han
167 D'ENTREVES, supra note 164, at 22.
168 WANG ET AL., MINFA XINLUN [THE NEW COMMENTS ON THE CIVIL LAW] 31 (1986); see
also EDITING GROUP OF "A HISTORY OF FOREIGN LEGAL SYSTEM," EDITING DEPARTMENT OF
THE LEGAL TEXTBOOK, WAIGUo FAZHI SHI [A HISTORY OF FOREIGN LEGAL SYSTEM] 93-94
(Chen ed., 1982).
169 WANG ET AL., supra note 168, at 32; see also P. JIANG, ZICHAN JIEJI MINSHANG FA [THE
CIVIL & COMMERCIAL LAW OF THE BOURGEOISIE] 3 (1981).
170 ROSENBERG & BIRDZELL, supra note 96, at 140.
171 Cf ROSENBERG & BIRDZELL, supra note 96, at 132.
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Dynasty (224-06 B. C.) and came to its maturity in the Tang Dynasty
(618-907). It then entered into a stagnant stage until the beginning of this
century, when the royal court reluctantly conducted a Western style-ori-
ented legal reform.172 This reform meant the general collapse of the
traditional system. The traditional Chinese legal system and the relevant
philosophies were inimical to the impulse to commercial profit 17 3 for the
three reasons that will be discussed below.
(1). Incalculability
China was ruled by man rather than by law, so that the Chinese
legal system was incalculable or unpredictable, and, in turn, inimical to
commercial activity. In traditional China, law was taken as merely one
of the governmental tools to control society. The emperor was the
supreme judge of any litigation174 and the supreme lawmaker. The em-
peror's edict could change or abolish other laws. In the Western Han
Dynasty, the Minister of Justice [Tingwei] Du Zhou tried cases accord-
ing to the emperor's opinions only, paying no attention to statutes.
Someone questioned him on that and Du Zhou's well-known reply goes,
"Where does the law come from? What the former emperors approved is
law, what the later emperor approved is law, too. Each [of the edicts] is
for a certain time, so why must we follow the former?" '175
Judicial power, instead of being separated from other powers, was
checked by administrative power, particularly in the Ming and Qing Dy-
nasties.1 76 After the Tang Dynasty, judicial organs were set up at the
provincial level, but they were checked by administrative officials at a
higher level. At the provincial level, legal problems were in the charge of
administrative officials. 177 The central government had judicial organs
and important cases were tried by this judiciary or by the judiciary to-
gether with other ministers.1 78 The two general trends in the judicial sys-
tem's evolution were increasing administrative interference and
increasing imperial interference.
179
Rule by man, a characteristic of the Chinese legal system, partly
172 Cf Wu, The Status of the Individual in the Political and Legal Traditions of Old and New
China, in THE CHINESE MIND, supra note 35, at 344.
173 A HISTORY OF CHINESE LEGAL THOUGHT, supra note 46, at 11-12.
174 S. WANG & Y. Xu, ZHONGGUO FAZHI SHIGANG [THE OUTLINE OF CHINESE LEGAL His-
TORY] 141 (1986).
175 A HISTORY OF THE CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 149, at 133-34.
176 A HISTORY OF THE CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 149, at 3-4.
177 A HISTORY OF THE CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 149, at 3.
178 WANG & Xu, supra note 174, at 147-48; see also A HISTORY OF THE CHINESE LEGAL SYS-
TEM, supra note 149, at 162-64.
179 WANG & XU, supra note 174, at 162.
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resulted from the significant role of morality. Legalism, a major school
of thought in ancient China, relied on penal law and denied the role of
morality, whereas Confucianism emphasized the role of morality in the
society but did not absolutely reject law. In the Western Han Dynasty,
the two schools combined together. After the gradual process of "Con-
fucianization of law," the legal system was characterized by, among
other things, Morality-Principal and Law-Subordinate [Dezhu
Xingfu]. t8 0 In the last three dynasties, the Yuan (1271-1368), the Ming
(1368-1644), the Qing (1644-1911), the rulers maintained that he who
knew the Confucian classics well was good at law.181
People apparently had much greater autonomy in the field of moral-
ity than the free volition allowed by law. 82 Therefore, in addition to
various political or administrative considerations, "frequently, judicial
judgments based on Confucian theory went beyond the article of the
code, for the ancient Chinese system allowed for considerable freedom in
interpreting and applying the law."' 8 3 "Rule by man" did not mean that
there was no law in traditional China, for in every dynasty the govern-
ment enacted many laws. "Rule by man" instead meant that the law
played a minor role and that the man applying the laws was the deciding
factor.1
8 4
It is true that in the West there had been no distinct line between
law and morality since ancient Greece, and it was not until the Enlight-
enment that the Natural Law school of thought paved the way for eman-
cipating law from morality. It is also true that no legal system in the
world could exclude the broad concepts carrying moral connotations. 18 5
However, that is not the point here. The point is that in the later Middle
Ages, a large number of cities and towns emerged with the expansion of
commerce; consequently, there was a need for a new social order based
upon a system making the legal consequences of people's activities calcu-
lable and coherent. Roman law is characterized by a "formal, logical
mode of juristic reasoning, ostensibly free from discretionary, ritualistic,
religious, or magical considerations."' 8 6 That is one of the reasons that
Roman law revived, that the Roman Law System took form, and that the
Roman Corpus Juris Civilis, the theoretical source of Roman law, became
180 Cn'u, supra note 150, at 267-79.
181 Z. Wu & S. Li, FAXUE GAILUN [AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW] 4 (1987).
182 BODENHEIMER, supra note 103, at 295.
183 CH'U, supra note 150, at 275.
184 Chan, Chinese Theory and Practice, with Special Reference to Humanism, in THE CHINESE
MIND, supra note 35, at 22.
185 BODENHEIMER, supra note 103, at 296, 299.
186 ROSENBERG & BIRDZELL, supra note 96, at 116.
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the book, next to the Bible, having the most profound influence in human
history. 187
In traditional China, on the contrary, there was never the kind of
social change which would require a new order based upon a legal system
for the calculability and coherence of civil or commercial activities. The
Chinese people took it for granted, as Confucius' held, that "[where there
are] men, their government will flourish; but without the men, their gov-
ernment must cease."'18 Subordinating law to politics and morality con-
formed perfectly to Chinese traditional culture. Few Chinese people
considered whether the law in such a subordinate position was calculable
in the sense of a "formal, logical mode of juristic reasoning." Civil and,
particularly, commercial activities require, among other things, a calcu-
lable system under which they could proceed as they were expected to
beforehand. Very few Chinese people considered whether the incalcula-
ble law was inimical to trade, if they cared about the development of
trade at all. Since the Chinese legal system did not lend itself to calcula-
bility, it inevitably discouraged people's impulse to commercial profit.1
89
(2). The Underdeveloped Civil Law
Chinese civil law was even less developed than was Chinese com-
mercial law. In the Tang Dynasty, Chinese law became unprecedentedly
systematic and comprehensive, and became the model for some other
Asian countries, like Japan, to follow. But Chinese law was underdevel-
oped compared with its Western counterparts, at least after the rise of
the bourgeois class there. Instead of developing "from Status to Con-
tract," traditional Chinese society was steadily based upon patriarchy
and hierarchy. The Chinese legal system had failed to integrate such
common principles as equality between individuals and freedom of con-
tract, which are the requisites for the development of commerce. In all
litigation, it was the litigant's status, family or social, which was given
the first consideration. Only when the particular law concerning status
could not be applied, was the general law used. 190 In a nation content
with agriculture, as Montesquieu held, their laws were supposed to be
less developed than that of a nation attached to commerce and
navigation.191
What is worse, however, is that in Chinese law codes the rules deal-
187 D'ENTREVES, supra note 164, at 22.
188 CH'U, supra note 150, at 257.
189 ROSENBERG & BIRDZELL, supra note 96, at 116.
190 CH'u, supra note 150, at 280.
191 MONTESQUIEU, supra note 101, at 279.
Chinese Patent Law
14:15 (1993)
ing with civil issues were less developed than those dealing with criminal
and administrative issues. 192 Until the beginning of this century, civil law
and criminal law, substantive law and procedural law, had been mixed
together in Chinese codes. 19 3 It is not unique to the Chinese law codes,
however, that all kinds of law were mixed together. The first written law
in ancient Rome, the Twelve Tables (450-449 B.C.), for example, also
evidenced this problem. The difference between Western law and Chi-
nese law in the past, among other things, is that the Twelve Tables, the
foundation of the later development of the Roman law, were mainly civil
laws dealing with the possession of land, obligation, family, inheritance,
etc. 194 In addition, civil issues were regulated less and less with physical
penalty, and in the later Middle Ages an independent body of commer-
cial law emerged. 195
The first comparatively comprehensive written law in Chinese his-
tory, Fajing, was mainly comprised of criminal law and criminal proce-
dure. It was enacted under Li Kui (455?-395 B.C.), the founder of
Legalism. Legalism was a major school of thought in ancient China, no-
torious for its strict holding that the state was the end and all-important,
while the people were the means to an end and individuals' rights were to
be ignored. 196 Naturally, the guiding idea of Fajing was that "Nothing is
more crucial for the monarchic government than [stopping] the violation
of property rights and injury to the person." Fajing, which had a
profound influence in the later development of Chinese law, had six parts
which "were all rules dealing with crimes."' 197 The Chinese code in each
dynasty was mainly comprised of criminal laws, and until the beginning
of this century, civil litigations accompanied physical penalty, and an
independent commercial law never emerged. 198
A fundamental reason for this characteristic of the Chinese legal
system was that while the Chinese government was more powerful than
its Western counterpart, the Chinese lawmakers were concerned about
the emperor's authority or power over the society, and consequently,
criminal law directly punished those who made a disturbance. With the
omnipresent authority of the government, lawmakers did not need to cre-
192 FAIRBANK & REISHAUER, supra note 86, at 54.
193 A HISTORY OF THE CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 149, at 340-41.
194 A HISTORY OF THE CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 149, at 51; see also WAIGUO FAZHI
SHIGANG [THE LEGAL HISTORY TEACHING AND RESEARCHING OFFICE OF CHINA UNIVERSITY OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND LAW, A CONCISE HISTORY OF FOREIGN LEGAL SYSTEM] 28-29 (1988).
195 Zhang, On Some Issues in Ancient Chinese Civil Law Studies, 11 FALU [LAW] 99-100 (1985).
196 Wu, supra note 172, at 342.
197 A HISTORY OF CHINESE LEGAL THOUGHT, supra note 46, at 77-78.
198 Zhang, supra note 195, at 99-100.
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ate a civil law dealing with private problems between individuals, because
common people's private interests were taken as insignificant trifles
[xigu]. 199
In traditional China, the emperor's authority was the link integrat-
ing the sociopolitical and the cultural-moral orders °" for the hierarchy
and the patriarchy. The authority of the emperor, which was of the
greatest concern to lawmakers, was supported theoretically by the Three
Cardinal Guides: "Ruler guides subject, father guides son, and husband
guides wife." The Three Cardinal Guides constituted the fundamental
Confucian doctrine. These were elaborated by Zhongshu Dong (179-104
B.C.) and upheld by the rulers in the dynasties that followed. Of these
three guides, "ruler guides subject" was the most important.201 Fairbank
claimed that China's whole ethical system was not oriented toward the
state,202 but that claim seems incompatible with the Three Cardinal
Guides accepted by the Chinese for 2000 years. In fact, Chinese scholars
generally hold that after the Western Han Dynasty, ethics were com-
bined with politics and called Political-Ethics [Zhengzhi-lunli], and this
objectionable combination restrained the Chinese people's innovative
spirit.
20 3
The Three Cardinal Guides were not only the fundamental princi-
ples of Chinese ethics2 0 but also the principles underlying the Chinese
legal system.20 5 Ironically, this famous Confucian doctrine was originally
put forward by the famous Legalist Han Fei (280-233 B.C.). The Qin
Dynasty (221-207), based upon Legalism, was the most tyrannical dy-
nasty in Chinese history. This short-lived dynasty eventually discredited
Legalism.206 Nevertheless, from the Three Cardinal Guides, we could see
that the Confucian scholar Zhongshu Dong (179-104 B.C.) covered the
Legalist doctrine with Confucianism in a way and the Chinese legal sys-
tem accepted the Legalist doctrine---"Exalting the ruler while humbling
the subject [Zunjun beicen]." Another famous Confucian scholar, Xi
Zhu (1130-1200), asserted, "The laws in Qin Dynasty were all for ex-
alting the ruler while humbling the subject. . . .How could the later
199 Zhang, supra note 195, at 100.
200 Y. LIN, THE CRISIS OF CHINESE CONSCIOUSNESS 16 (1979).
201 A HISTORY OF CHINESE LEGAL THOUGHT, supra note 46, at 169-170.
202 FAIRBANK & REISCHAUER, supra note 86, at 15.
203 Song, supra note 100, at 93-97; see also Bao, Confucian Ethics and the Asian Four Mini-
Dragons 1 MINGBAO YUKAN [MING PAO MONTHLY] 56-57 (1988); see also Liu, Confucianism and
Democracy ZHONGYING RIBAO [CENTRAL DAILY NEWS], May 17, 1988, at 1 (International ed.).
204 Liu, China's Historical Humane Thought and Monarchal Power, 4 NANKAI XUEBAO
[NANKAI JOURNAL] 9-11 (1986).
205 A HISTORY OF CHINESE LEGAL THOUGHT, supra note 46, at 5.
206 WANG & XU, supra note 174, at 61.
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[monarchy] change this doctrine willingly?"2 °7
While stressing criminal law for the emperor's authority, the Chi-
nese legal system ignored traders as well as trade in order to keep the
monarchic order. Zhong Guan (730-645 B.C.), the prime minister of Qi
State, raised the idea that the bachelor, which later came to refer to the
literati loosely, the farmer, the artisan, and the trader [shi, nong, gong,
shang] should live separately according to the occupation that they prac-
ticed. The purpose was to promote the development of each occupation.
It is questionable whether this idea was ever realized,20 8 but this hierar-
chic order, keeping the traders in the lowest social status, was followed in
every dynasty.20 9 Although trade was not generally excluded from the
society, it was restricted by the government to maintain the self-sufficient
agricultural economy. 2 0 The monarchic government, of course, would
not tolerate any independent social force which might break the conven-
tions of the highly unified society.
The traditional government policy-stressing agriculture while re-
pressing trade [zhongnongyishang]-levied heavy taxes on, and enforced
insulting rules over, the traders, 211 so that they lacked the freedom of
trade, a good environment for investment, and an independent personal-
ity. Traders' property could be requisitioned or confiscated with little
difficulty by the state, by corrupt officials, or by military leaders. Hence
the understandable saying among traders, "Seek wealth by the lowest
occupation (trade), and maintain the wealthy by the principal occupation
(agriculture). 2 12 The monarchic government kept the trades and the
handicraft industries at a level "neither flourishing nor declining" by
policy and by law.2 1
In addition to the policy of stressing agriculture while repressing
trade, since the Qin Dynasty (221-207 B.C.) the government had often
monopolized some industries and trades relevant to salt, iron, tea, wine,
silk fabrics, etc..214 The most profitable businesses were run by the gov-
ernment.215 In the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911), foreign trade and private
mining industries were forbidden or strictly regulated; heavy taxes were
levied on trades and manufacture; the products made by the state-owned
207 Yu, supra note 109, at 340-41, 348, 353.
208 1 A CONCISE HISTORY OF CHINESE ECONOMIC THOUGHT, supra note 122, at 22-24.
209 Hu, supra note 123, at 62.
210 Bao, supra note 203, at 59.
211 Yan, supra note 157, at 140-41.
212 Lin, Changes in the Social Status of Merchants during the Tang and Song Dynasties, I HIS-
TORY STUDIES 141 (1989).
213 Ye, supra note 137, at 134, 146.
214 Zhang, supra note 195, at 101.
215 Lin, supra note 212, at 142.
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workshops were tributes to the government, not circulating in the mar-
kets. Consequently, the civil laws were mainly about land, houses, crops;
few were about trades and manufacture.
2 '1 6
The underdeveloped civil law in the Chinese codes also resulted
from the significant role of domestic discipline [jiafa]-the Confucian
moral doctrine and customary law applied to family members. From the
Western Zhou Dynasty (the 1lth century-771 B.C.) to the last dynasty,
the Qing Dynasty, domestic discipline not only existed but became in-
creasingly socially important. After the Song Dynasty (960-1279), do-
mestic discipline was formally recognized by the government as the
supplement to the law codes. In the Ming (1368-1644) and Qing Dynas-
ties (1644-1911), the government vested the patriarch with additonal
rights over family members.2 17 Domestic discipline regulated the
problems of property, inheritance, marriage, etc. within the house-
hold.21 The patriarch or the head of a family was the supreme authority
of the family to apply domestic discipline, with the exception of the
power of life and death. The patriarch was also responsible to the state
for the family members' behavior. The household functioned as the basic
legal unit, with the result that many problems were settled without re-
course to the law court. 2 19
Accordingly, a Chinese seldom thought of himself or herself as an
isolated entity.220 Since the most admired value was loyalty to the em-
peror (the state) and filial piety to the parents, the interests or the value
of an individual meant little. The individual interest or value was real-
ized normally through the relations, family or social, which he or she was
in.22' The patriarchy as well as the hierarchy supported by the Three
Cardinal Guides checked people's impulse to commercial profit, and ob-
structed the possible development of civil law, not to mention commer-
cial law.
It should be realized that, in world history, China was not the only
country where trade and handicraft industries were looked down upon.
In ancient Greece, mercenary works were considered unworthy, and in
the early Middle Ages, canon law provided that the sins of trades could
not be forgiven. Even in the 13th century, bleaching, weaving, tanning,
dyeing, and shoemaking were all considered dishonorable businesses for
216 A HISTORY OF THE CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 149, at 316-19.
217 WANG & Xu, supra note 174, at 103-04; see also Zhang, supra note 195, at 101, 109.
218 Zhang, supra note 195, at 101; see also A HISTORY OF CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note
149, at 3-4.
219 CH'U, supra note 150, at 40.
220 Wu, supra note 172, at 346.
221 WEI, supra note 142, at 50-53.
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clergymen, though there seemed to be no religious rules against farm-
ing.222 The main difference between China and the West later on was
that in China, the monarchic government was strong enough to keep a
legal system characterized by stressing criminal law while ignoring civil
law. Therefore, such a highly unified society excluded an independent
bourgeois class. In the West, on the contrary, the much weaker govern-
ments were unable to control a powerful bourgeois class which rose in
the pluralistic society with, among other things, the independent com-
mercial law.
In the West, even after the Middle Ages, the most powerful king in
Europe had to accept disobedience in his kingdom as perfectly normal.
In England, landed gentry and nobility were independent from the royal
court and their adoption of commercial agriculture partly in response to
the growth of commerce and manufacture was one of the factors in the
development of democracy there.223
[T]he Europe of the late medieval city-states and the early monarchies came
to the age of discovery without a central authority strong enough to check
the determination of its merchants to gain access to profitable trading op-
portunities, even though some satrap or other had forbidden such access or
claimed it as a private preserve. The central authority which eventually
emerged did not take the form of a single monolithic empire, but of a group
of nation-states which continued, among themselves, the early city-state
competition for trade.224
To be sure, one of the conspicuous differences in economic history
between China and the West is that private ownership originated much
earlier in China.225 In China, the emperor-ownership (state-ownership)
was described by a famous poem,
Under the wide heaven,
All is King's Land.
Within the sea-boundaries of the land,
All are the King's servants.226
This situation has, of course, been dramatically changed since the Spring
and Autumn Period (770-476 B.C.) and the Warring State (475-221
B.C.). 227 Yet, the idea that the emperor was the highest sovereign over
the people remained deeply rooted in the Chinese mind during the
222 Wu, The Relative Primacy ofAgriculture and Commerce in World History, 1 HISTORY STUD-
iEs 5 (1984).
223 MOORE, supra note 102, at 40, 59.
224 ROSENBERG & BIRDZELL, supra note 96, at 60.
225 Zhao, The Origin and Development of Private Ownership in China, 4 MINBAO ZHOUKAN
[MING PAO MONTHLY] 15 (1988).
226 THE BOOK OF POETRY-THE CHINESE CLASSIcS 360 (J. Legge trans., 1966).
227 A HISTORY OF THE CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 149, at 53-54.
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following 2000 years,2 2 8 which is why this poem was so famous in
Chinese history. Under the powerful monarchic government and a legal
system inimical to civil law, the earlier establishment of private
ownership, like the earlier development of science and technology, was
followed by prolonged stagnation, not an earlier revolutionary advance.
(3). The Legal Philosophy
The traditional Chinese philosophy of law discouraged the pursuit
of self-interest through the making of money. Before discussing this
characteristic of Chinese tradition, it should be clarified that Chinese law
could hardly have any positive influence on people's attitude toward
commercial profit, though there were legal rules regulating civil issues in
every dynasty. In the West, the Roman Law System germinated without
any affimation by a political power,229 and the scholars on the European
Continent enthusiastically studied Roman law generation after genera-
tion. The Common Law germinated with the support of the British royal
court, and the authority of law could be seen from what Henry Bracton
(?-1268) claimed, "[T]he king ought to be under God and the law."230
Law was respected because law was the very basis of the "civil order." '231
With such an authority and dignity, the law would be able to have an
active impact on people's morality.
In traditional China, in the Qin Dynasty (221-207 B.C.) when the
rulers thought much of law, people could study legal rules from the offi-
cials, though private study or discussion was forbidden. In the Han Dy-
nasty (206 B.C.-220 A.D.), Confucian scholars taught law based on
Confucian classics emphasizing morality. In the Jin (265-420) and Tang
(618-907) Dynasties, many scholars, Confucian scholars still studied and
explained former law codes. But after the Tang Dynasty, very few schol-
ars studied law codes. Many law codes and private comments on them
were lost in history.232 In the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911), the emperor
Yong Zheng even criticized the local officials, for they often praised their
knowledge of Confucian classics, poetry, chess, and art, with great enthu-
siasm, but they knew little of law, which was to have been studied seri-
ously as their official duty.233 Traditional China was ruled by men and
228 Liu, supra note 204, at 4-7.
229 DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 159, at 40.
230 LLOYD, supra note 163, at 31.
231 DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 159, at 52.
232 WANG & Xu, supra note 174, at 58; see also A HISTORY OF THE CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM,
supra note 149, at 4.




the law was not taken as the very basis of the "civil order." Naturally,
few people explored the philosophy of law in Chinese history.234 Without
the authority and the dignity, the law was by no means a powerful leaven
to transform people's morality for commercial profit, not to mention the
fact that there were few commercial rules in Chinese codes.
On the one hand, the Chinese legal system had little positive influ-
ence on the Chinese people's attitude toward commercial law; on the
other, Confucian doctrine made litigation an unworthy activity. Con-
fucian philosophy of law exalted the significance of morality and offered
law a minor role, a regrettable necessity, in the society. However, tradi-
tional Chinese philosophy of law should be understood primarily from
the ideologized Confucianism which was omnipresent. There was no
legal jurisdiction independent from the administration, nor jurisprudence
from Confucianism. John Keynes (1883-1946) once said,
The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are
right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly un-
derstood. Indeed, the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who be-
lieved themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are
usually the slaves of some defunct economist.235
That is particularly true in China, because, first, Confucius, though not
an economist, enjoyed greater respect in traditional China than any
scholar did in the West. Confucianism was accepted by the Chinese as
the essential part of their culture. Second, and more significantly, Con-
fucianism was forcefully supported for 2000 years as the official ideology
by the governments.
Confucius once said, "If you lead the people by political measures
and regulate them by penal laws, they will merely avoid transgressing
them but will have no sense of honor. If you lead them by the practice of
virtue and regulate them by the inculcation of good manners, they will
not only keep their sense of honor but will also be thoroughly trans-
formed. ' 236 This was the basic attitude of the Chinese people toward law.
Let us see two typical stories which reflect the attitude of Confucian-
ism. Once two brothers sued each other for farms. Magistrate Su
Ch'iung said, "The most precious thing in the world is brotherly affec-
tion, and the least precious is a piece of land. Why should you quarrel
over the least precious at the expense of the most precious?" On hearing
the sagacious admonition, the two brothers settled their ten-year dispute
234 A HISTORY OF THE CHINESE LEGAL SYSTEM, supra note 149, at 4.
235 JOHN M. KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY 383
(1936).
236 J. Wu, Chinese Legal and Political Philosophy, in THE CHINESE MIND, supra note 35, at 220-
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by embracing each other. With neither a property law nor an elaboration
on the merits, the Magistrate disposed of the case by way of "an irresisti-
ble charm.
'2 37
The second story begins with a Magistrate having found a thief on
the top beam of his room. The Magistrate pretended not to notice the
thief. Instead, he called his family members together and said, "Each of
you must diligently attend to his duties. You should know that robbers
and thieves are not bad by nature. They became such only through the
habit of laziness. The gentleman on the top beam is a case in point." On
hearing these words, the frightened thief fell down to the ground. The
Magistrate spoke to the thief softly, "Judging by your appearance, you
are not a bad man. I only hope you will correct your mistake and do
good. Probably your wrong-doing is due to your poverty; I here give you
two pieces of silk to help you start anew." So deeply moved was the thief
that he became a reformed man. This story was known to the local peo-
ple and there was neither thief nor robber in the district after that.
2 38
Long before the days of Confucianism, the spirit of harmony had
formed in China. It was believed that people's happiness depended on
harmony. The Confucian principles of the Golden Mean [Zhongyong]
and of Reciprocity [Shudao] are little more than the spirit of harmony.
Showing his preference for social harmony, Confucius said, "in hearing
lawsuits I act like other men, but it is necessary to put an end to litiga-
tion." If litigation could not be avoided, the Chinese people were always
ready to come to terms by meeting the opponent halfway. This spirit was
a decided contrast to the advice of Rudolf von Jhering (1818-1892),
"Bring suit, cost what it may!' 23 9 The Chinese government attempted to
enact laws for social harmony, by trying to dissolve rather than resolve
disputes. Thus, the Western image of the blindfolded Themis holding
the scales of justice would rarely have been given top priority by Chinese
officials.24 The philosophy supporting physical penalty, with which civil
cases were settled, was that such cases violated social harmony.24'
237 Wu, supra note 172, at 350.
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A most unequivocal expression of the Western values and Western
law about the pursuit of self-interest by the making of money comes from
Justice Holmes (1841-1935): "A man has a right to set up a shop in a
small village which can support but one of a kind, although he expects
and intends to ruin a deserving widow who is established there al-
ready. '2 42 Such values and law were completely incompatible with Con-
fucianism. The Chinese legal system emphasized personal duty, and the
notion of personal rights was less developed than that in the Common
Law and Roman Law.2 43 This characteristic could be understood partly
by "Confucianization of law." Under Confucianism, people were sup-
posed to know the notions of propriety and concession as their duties to
others. In order to be respectable, people should first fulfill their duties
rather than claim their rights. If people could concede their rights rather
than their duties in daily life, it was alleged, there would be no quarrels
among people. 2 "
If, on the other hand, people chose to go to courts of law to settle
their disputes, "the enforcement of law by authority was a tacit admis-
sion that the cultivation of virtue through education had failed. Con-
fucian gentlemen viewed the application of sanction as 'a regrettable
necessity,' a last resort for vulgar people only. ' 245 The Chinese had the
deep-rooted idea that it was shameful to go to court. Since there was the
tradition of scorning commercial profit, as discussed above, it would be
still more shameful to claim monetary rights against others in a court of
law.
Weber held that unchaining economic impulses does not necessarily
produce rational results in the world.246 At the same time, however, Chi-
nese history suggests that holding economic desires in check may pro-
duce even more irrational results. Irrational institutions, such as
allowing people's capitalistic impulses to be realized only through study-
ing Confucian classics, were not established in China after an unchaining
of economic impulses; it was not that the Chinese tried in vain to find
rational institutions after such an unchaining, but that the economic im-
pulses were never unchained in the first place. If economic impulses are
universal, rational institutions must require their unchaining as a con-
comitant condition, if not a prerequisite.
Weber also held, as mentioned above, that what the monarchy
242 Holmes, Privilege, Malice and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REv. 1, 3 (1894).
243 Wu, supra note 172, at 219.
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wanted most was political stability based upon subjects' loyalty, and the
monarchic order was the death of everything necessary for the develop-
ment of capitalism. Weber's comment was particularly apt for China,
where the monarchy was far more highly bureaucratized and centralized
than its Western counterpart. The Chinese monarchy brought peace to
Chinese society and excluded some possible civil law or social turbu-
lence.24 7 The maintenance of the vast empire was, however, not without
cost. The Chinese monarchy greatly contributed to the prolonged stag-
nation of the Chinese economy, though private ownership was estab-
lished much earlier than in the West. The monarchic order also greatly
contributed to the prolonged smothering of people's impulse to commer-
cial profit, through the legal system as well as through the ideologized
Confucianism.
Essentially, a patent law requires the unchaining of people's impulse
to commercial profit, and the justification of the pursuit of commercial
profit morally as well as legally. According to Western history, patent
law, utilizing people's economic impulse as the incentive to science and
technology, is a rational institution.2 48 Hence, in the light of a patent
law, the monarchic order is irrational. If the monarchic order, no matter
under what guise, still lingers in China today, the relevant tradition must
be inimical to the PRC's Patent Law, if not in fact reducing the law to
impotence. What was the PRC's attitude towards this tradition of scorn-
ing commercial profit while insisting on Confucian morality under Mao?
In other words, what was the CCP's attitude towards the monarchy,
which was behind the tradition, before the patent law was enacted under
Deng?
C. The Traditions Utilized by Mao Zedong
Theoretically, the PRC is a democratic and republic state where all
the power belongs to the people. Practically speaking, the PRC govern-
ment is more highly bureaucratized and centralized than its predeces-
sors.24 9 Further, the CCP's "leadership is highly personalized and
hardly institutionalized."2 5 The feudal patriarchal style and the feudal
247 Cf. C. Liu & Q. YANG, ZHONGGUO SHEHUI, CONG BUBIAN DAO JUBIAN [CHINESE SOCI-
ETY, FROM THE UNCHANGED TO THE DRASTICALLY CHANGED] 53 (1989).
248 There have been different opinions about the advantages and the disadvantages of patents in
the world. But, the general enactment of patent laws in the world may presume that it is taken as a
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249 Li, The Problem of China's Political Structure, in ZHONGGUO DE WEIJI YU SIKAO [CHINA'S
CRISIS AND CONSIDERATION] 335-38 (Li ed., 1989).




autocratic style, as the Chinese openly admitted after Mao's death, were
strong within the CCP and the government.251 Karl Marx (1818-1883)
held, "The bourgeoisie cannot exist without constantly revolutionizing
the instruments of production." '252 The Chinese proletariat under Mao,
however, exercised the dictatorship firmly over the people without revo-
lutionizing the instruments of production for decades. As long as China
remained a closed society, as it was in the past, the CCP might hold the
reins of government with little development of science and technology.
The PRC government explicitly committed itself to the development
of science and technology in the 1950's.253 The leadership regarded sci-
ence and technology as the means to achieve wealth, power, and status in
the world. Under Mao, the Chinese exploded atom bombs, launched a
man-made satellite, and made other breakthroughs in science and tech-
nology relevant to national defense. The achievements are admirable if
the cost the Chinese people paid is not considered. The PRC's commit-
ment to science and technology did not remain consistent, nor did it have
any intention to enact a patent law. The most important thing for the
CCP and the PRC was to make sure that "[T]he force at the core leading
our cause forward is the Chinese Communist Party. The theoretical ba-
sis guiding our thinking is Marxism-Leninism." '254
In particular, the CCP leadership, like the monarchical rulers,
wanted to control the literati-the only potential opponent in the highly
unified society. Early in 1951, the government leader Enlai Zhou taught
the literati: you should learn "the ideology of the progressive elements of
the working class, including the revolutionary theories of Mao Zedong
and the actual practice of the Chinese revolution." '255 In 1957, Mao
Zedong admonished the literati, "Both students and intellectuals should
study hard. In addition to the study of their specialized subjects, they
must make progress both ideologically and politically, which means that
they should study Marxism-Leninism, current events and politics. Not
to have a correct political point of view is like having no soul." '256 The
literati were not counted as part of the glorious working class by the
251 The Commentator of Law Journal, To Eliminate the Feudal Evil Legacy Is An Important Task
on the Political and Legal Front, PEOPLE'S DAILY, Nov. 28, 1980, at 5 (overseas ed.).
252 KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO, PRINCIPLES OF COM-
MUNISM, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO AFTER 100 YEARS 7 (1964).
253 Goldman & Simon, supra note 5, at 7.
254 QUOTATIONS FROM CHAIRMAN MAO TSE-TUNG 1 (A. Barnett introduction, 1967).
255 Franz Michael, Ideology, Reality and Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA 102, 107 (Yuan-Li Wu et. al. eds., 1988).
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CCP. They had to study Mao's works to remodel their world outlook,
which allegedly belonged to the bourgeoisie.
If people, particularly the literati, had some ideas suspected to be
incompatible with Marxism-Leninism-Maoism, they might be persecuted
ruthlessly.257 Even the most accomplished scientists, like Weichang
Qian, were by no means exempted.258 The stagnant-minded literati was
much more tightly controlled under Mao than during any other period in
Chinese history.25 9 During the Cultural Revolution (1966-1967), the lit-
erati became the notorious "Stinking Number Ninth" [Choulaojiu], the
last of the nine groups of social outcasts of the regime.2" The 1975 Con-
stitution openly provided that "The proletariat must exercise all-round
dictatorship over the bourgeoisie in the superstructure, including all
spheres of culture. ' 2 61 Under such terrible pressure, the literati, as a
whole, had little enthusiasm for science and technology.
Under Mao, people of all walks of life-science and technology, art,
education, sports, cooking, etc.-had their ranks which were officially set
up and controlled by the government. These rankings determined privi-
lege, salary, housing, health care, travel, and the like, so that people de-
sired a high rank.2 62 Or rather, people were attracted by an official
career, because the CCP and government cadres were given higher sala-
ries and more privileges than were other professions.2 63 "[I]n terms of the
values rather than the practical achievements of the PRC, the first-class
personages today are still the politicians, not the physicists, chemists,
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writers, nor entrepreneurs,"264 This government policy supported the
Maoist principle that "Politics always comes first" [Tuchu zhengzhi].
Historically, choosing an official career by studying Confucian classics
was the most honorable and profitable way for the literati. The situation
in the PRC was similar.
The tradition of scorning commercial profit while insisting on Con-
fucian morality was utilized comprehensively by Mao, if we change
"Confucian morality" into "communist morality." In fact, this tradition
had not been discredited seriously before the establishment of the PRC in
1949. It is true that traditional Chinese economic thought had collapsed
by the 1919 May Fourth Movement. In China from 1919 to 1949, at
least 2000 works of Western economics were published, including the
translations. More than 100 modem economic journals had been estab-
lished in addition to those published by universities and government.
With more and more scholars returning from the West, the universities
became dominated by various Western economics.26 5
Nevertheless, the bourgeoisie never grew into a strong class in
China. Western notions like commercial profitability and the spirit of
enterprise were never generally recognized in China.26 6 While wanting
Western wealth and democracy, Sun Yet-sen (1866-1925), the founder of
the Republic of China, criticized the evil exploitation and class polariza-
tion of the West.267 Yet-sen wanted to inherit and carry forward Con-
fucian morality.
268
After the 1917 Russian October Revolution, Marxism and Leninism
were introduced into China. From 1920 to 1949, more than 222 Marxist
economic works were translated into Chinese, opposing the economic
theory of the bourgeoisie.269 Even Sun Yet-sen seemed to prefer Marxist
economic theory to that of Adam Smith.270
In the 1950s, the PRC set up its economic structure on the Soviet
model. The economy was primarily state-owned, and the economic ac-
tivities were primarily planned by the state.271 The situation was just as
264 Y. Yu, Some Viewpoints on the Characteristics of Chinese History, in LISHI Yu SIXIANG [HIS-
TORY AND THOUGHT] 281 (1976).
265 Hu, supra note 83, at 226-27, 380, 382-83.
266 Cf. Beaumont, supra note 6, at 39, 44.
267 Z. Li, On Sun Yet-sen's Thought, in ZHONGGUO JINDAI SIXIANGSHI LUN [ON MODERN
CHINESE INTELLECTUAL HISTORY] 337-41 (1986).
268 Q. Fu, ZHONGSHAN SIXIANG Tixi [SUN YET-SEN'S IDEOLOGICAL SYSTEM] 24-27 (1986).
269 Hu, supra note 83, at 394-95, 433, 483.
270 Li, supra note 267, at 341-42.
271 Yang, On the Issues of the Economic Structure Reform, in THE EXPLORATION OF CONTEMPO-
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Lenin (1870-1924) put it: "All citizens become employees and workers
of a single nationwide state 'syndicate.' . . .The whole society will have
become a single office and a single factory, with equality of labor and
equality of pay." '27 2 The Chinese people generally owned no means of
production, but only the means of livelihood. The insignificant private
economy was limited to very small producers and peddlers, who were
looked down upon socially as the remnants of the old society.
In 1957, Mao warned, "A dangerous tendency has shown itself.. .a
concern for personal fame and gain. '2 73 The impulse toward acquisition
or the pursuit of money was not merely something morally shameful, but
something politically dangerous. This impulse might well prove that such
people "could not withstand sugar-coated bullets" from the bourgeoi-
sie.274 Or, it might prove that they were the bourgeois elements origi-
nally. During the Cultural Revolution, even the pursuit of profit by the
state-owned enterprises was called "Putting profit in command" [Liren
Guasual], a bourgeois idea to be criticized under Maoism.275 On the
other hand, before the Cultural Revolution few commercial activities ex-
isted and practically speaking, there were few legal ways for people to
pursue money.
The Chinese people were also instructed repeatedly by the CCP with
Mao's teaching, "We must all learn the spirit of absolute selflessness
from [Norman Bethune]. With this spirit everyone can be very useful to
the people. A man's ability may be great or small, but if he has this
spirit, he is already noble-minded and pure, ..."276 The CCP often set up
some "selfless" proletarian heroes and heroines for the Chinese to learn
from. In 1963, all the top leaders of China called on the people to learn
about Feng Lei, a driver in the army who became the "communist sol-
dier" through studying Mao's works.2 77 The Chinese people, particularly
the literati, spent much time responding. During the Cultural Revolu-
tion, the literati were ordered by Mao to receive re-education from the
workers, peasants, and soldiers.2 7 8 Interwoven with political struggles,
the criticism and self-criticism against the "bourgeois philosophy of life"
became common and cruel.
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The revised tradition, "scorning commercial profit while insisting on
communist morality," was supported by the PRC's legal system. In
traditional China, people had no idea of "democracy" or "popular sover-
eignty." The emperor with the divine right was the master of the peo-
ple.279 Confucianism and Legalism were the two primary schools of
thought, both took law as the government's instrument to control the
people.280 Similarly, Russian leader Lenin asserted that "The individual
rights of citizens, of course, do not constrain Soviet power but are
granted only for the development of the country's productive forces." '281
Lenin also stated that Russia's law embodied "The expression of the will
of the classes, which have emerged victorious and hold the power of the
state." '282 The CCP followed these Leninist principles as well as their
own Chinese traditions: socialist law was viewed as a tool to realize the
dictatorship of the proletariat,2"3 and democracy was taken as the mere
means to the end, not the end itself.284 Even under Deng Xiaoping, law
has still been the embodiment of the CCP's policy,285 and rights flow
from the state to the people as a gratuitous grant.28 6
The CCP established its legal system in the 1950's molded after that
of the former Soviet Union. But under Mao no basic law codes, like
criminal law, criminal procedure law, civil law, and civil procedure law,
were enacted. 287 Political campaigns and personal power played an im-
portant role socially. Legal nihilism prevailed and the study of legal the-
ory was replaced by politics or "class struggle" theory.288 When
problems arose, people normally turned to the persons in power-the
CCP cadres.2 89 Going to a court of law was still shameful and the last
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resort.
In traditional China, as discussed above, civil law was less developed
than criminal law. Similarly, in Soviet Union civil law was insignifi-
cant.2 90 After the 1917 Russian October Revolution, almost all Marxists
had a negative attitude toward the civil law, believing it was wanted by
capitalism and rejected by socialism.2 91 Although the civil code was
promulgated in 1922 under pragmatic Lenin and revised in 1964,292 the
economic relations in the Soviet Union were generally regulated by the
state plan and policy. In life,
Soviet society reacts with disapproval to the conduct of those citizens who
only seek a material benefit for themselves and pursue mercenary goals in
ordinary everyday interrelations. The taking of compensation for the tem-
porary lending of articles of personal use, interest-bearing loans, the rendi-
tion of personal services for pay, etc.-all these are not infrequently
regarded as departures from the rules of socialist community life.
29
Under Mao, many Chinese people simply did not quite know what
rights they could enjoy, such as the right to dispose their property by
their testaments. Nor did they know their duties, such as the duty not to
open others' letters freely.294 People's rights and interests were com-
monly violated.2 9s Private rights and interests had been ignored to such
an extent that after Deng came to power, one of the most prestigious law
journals carried an essay in 1981 discussing issues like "The Objective
Necessity of the Existence of Our Citizens' Private Ownership," "Why
Should the Citizens' Private Ownership Be Protected Legally?" 296
To highlight the planned economy and the public ownership of the
means of production, the Chinese repeated Lenin's idea as the Soviets
did, "We do not recognize anything 'private,' and regard everything.. .as
falling under public and not private law." This idea was re-emphasized
even when the General Principles of Civil Law of the PRC were promul-
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gated in 1986.297 Under Mao and even under Deng, in times of conflict,
the interests of the state come first, then that of the collectively owned
units. Individual interests come last. "This proposition has been a con-
sistent stand from Sun Yet-sen to Mao Zedong and has its historical
background." '298
In traditional China, "social success could not be reduced to vulgar
enrichment, but implied above all the acquisition of honors and offices
which gave access to political power and prestige. Chinese ethics
preached devotion to the state, personal culture, self-enforcement and
modesty. ' 299 These traditions lingered in, and were desired by, the PRC
under Mao. Such traditions contributed greatly to the stagnation of the
Chinese science and technology in the past. The inheritance of these tra-
ditions also contributed greatly to the fact that the PRC's science and
technology had fallen further behind the West, and even behind certain
developing countries of East Asia.3°
Having examined the relevant traditions, we may turn back to pat-
ent law. Patent law stimulates people's enthusiasm for science and tech-
nology by awarding them the proprietary monopoly over their
inventions, so that the patentees could pursue the greatest possible
amount of commercial profit. Patent law is in many ways a quintessence
of the assumptions of the Western society or of the values of the bour-
geoisie. A philosophy supporting patent law in the West is that "individ-
uals will realize the maximum welfare of the society through the pursuit
of their own individual interests. '30 1 Apparently, this institution is com-
patible with neither the Chinese traditions nor Marxism-Leninism-Mao-
ism. Therefore, it is natural that Article 23 of the Regulations on
Awards for Inventions, issued on November 3, 1963 by the PRC govern-
ment, provided that, "All inventions are the property of the state, and no
one or unit may claim monopoly over them. All units throughout the
country (including collectively owned units) may make use of the inven-
tions essential to them.
'302
CONCLUSION
Traditional Chinese cognitive methodologies and the relevant theo-
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ries, like the two-force and the five-element theory, are suitable to ancient
science and technology but unsuitable to the modem. Wanted by no-
body, they have naturally been falling into oblivion. When considering
the Chinese traditional culture relevant to the PRC's Patent Law, we
may dismiss them, just as we dismiss the specious claim of "a residual
mistrust of innovation."
It is very interesting to observe certain fundamental similarities be-
tween an ancient Oriental ideology, Confucianism, and a modem Occi-
dental ideology, Marxism-Leninism, and between the traditional Chinese
monarchic regime and the current socialist regime. When some of these
traditions were inherited and carried forward with socialist ideology by
Mao, the revised traditional culture became more inimical to the PRC's
Patent Law. Normally, people are not consciously aware of their cul-
ture, for culture hides itself most effectively from its own people. 3
When a new ideology is similar to the traditional values, this ideology
may be accepted by the people more easily than the dissimilar, and the
traditional values may be further strengthened by the new ideology, par-
ticularly when the ideology is an official one.
This is the case with traditions and Marxism-Leninism in modem
China in many ways. A nation's millennia-old culture cannot be
changed easily or quickly. However, it may still be changed when the
interests of both the people and the government are incompatible with
old traditions.
As an example, the strong sense of filial piety was a leading moral
principle in China for millennia. 31 If a parent asked for the death pen-
alty for an unfilial child, "the authorities might acquiesce, without giving
any consideration to the grounds on which the suit was brought." If the
father or the grandfather were alive, a son or grandson could not live
elsewhere, nor could he hold property privately. A son or grandson who
disobeyed this tenet would be sentenced to years of imprisonment. 30 5
Such old rules might well have been taken as right and proper in the past.
Since 1912 when the Republic of China was established, however, such
laws have been abolished.
The Chinese people's acceptance of the above harsh laws in the past
and the acceptance of the laws' abolition could be explained partly be-
cause the omnipresence of Confucianism resulted from government coer-
cion as well as from instillation, and not merely from people's willing
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observation. Actually, ideologized Confucianism was different even from
the original theories of Confucius, Mencius, Zhongshu Dong and Xi
Zhu. The ideologized Confucianism catered to the monarchic govern-
ment, but twisted the Chinese people's natural feeling and desire to a
considerable extent.30 6 Therefore, at the beginning of this century, when
the last monarchic dynasty (Qing) collapsed and the venerable Con-
fucianism was criticized, people were unoffended, if not relaxed, by the
abolition of the harsh laws.
A more concrete example of the changed traditional culture may be
seen in Taiwan, one of the Four Mini-Dragons in Asia. It is well-known
that the Taiwanese economy has developed rapidly for years.30 7 In Tai-
wan, the current legal system and its managerial methods of economy
have been introduced primarily from the West. Traditions such as
scorning commercial profit while insisting on Confucian morality must
have been changed generally. As a matter of fact,
[T]he rapidity with which the society was changing imparted a great flexi-
bility even to unenacted, unwritten custom. Custom, to be valid and bind-
ing, certainly did not need to be immemorial. On the contrary, ten or
twenty years usage was regarded as a "long custom," and forty years made
it "age-old.)
30 8
The traditions referred to throughout this article were needed by
bureaucratized and centralized monarchy based upon the self-sufficient
agricultural economy. A similar ideology is currently needed by the
more bureaucratized and centralized socialist regime based upon state-
planned economy. Such traditions and ideologies oppose people's capi-
talistic desires. A nation's modernization requires rational institutions
like patent law, and patent law requires the unchaining of economic im-
pulses. Hence, in the light of patent law, such traditions and ideology are
irrational. Without abandoning the irrational ideology, or rather, with-
out changing the political and economical structure of the socialist re-
gime, the PRC's Patent Law is doomed to remain insignificant.
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